Progress and economy: the clash of values over Oregon\u27s Trojan Nuclear Plant by Nipper, Gregory
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
1-1-2005
Progress and economy: the clash of values over Oregon's Trojan
Nuclear Plant
Gregory Nipper
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nipper, Gregory, "Progress and economy: the clash of values over Oregon's Trojan Nuclear Plant" (2005). Dissertations and Theses.
Paper 249.
10.15760/etd.249
THESIS APPROVAL
The abstract and thesis of Gregory Nipper for the Master of Arts in History
were presented June 2, 2005. and accepted by the thesis committee and
the department.
COMMITTEE APPROVALS:
Craig
_
Craig Shinn
Representative of the Office of
Graduate Studies
DEPARTMENT APPROVAL:
Department of History
ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Gregory Nipper for the Master of Arts in History
presented June 2, 2005.
Title: Progress and Economy: The Clash of Values Over Oregon's
Trojan Nuclear Plant.
From 1976 to 1992 Portland General Electric (PGE) -- a private utility
based in Portland, Oregon -- operated the Trojan Nuclear Plant near
Rainier, Oregon, on the bank of the Columbia River. Trojan was the first
commercial nuclear facility in the Pacific Northwest and was the largest such
facility in U.S. history. From its origins, Trojan was the focus of growing
conflict over atomic energy facilities and their environmental effects, risks,
and costs. This thesis traces the history of Trojan, including the conditions
in which PGE decided to build the plant as well as the changing conditions
in which the environmental movement in Oregon worked to impact the
operation of Trojan and the development of further atomic energy facilities in
the region.
Two sets of values, largely endemic to the region, came into conflict
in the debate over Trojan: one which valued preservation of vital natural
systems over all else, and another that elevated technological progress to
supreme importance in achieving the ultimate social good. Supporters of
Trojan and anti-nuclear activists both viewed misinformation about nuclear
2power as one of the central problems in the way that Oregon residents
viewed nuclear power. Although there were many loyal supporters of
Trojan, particularly in Columbia County, there were also a great number who
viewed the technology cautiously. While both PGE and nuclear opponents
worked diligently to sway public opinion, many activists did so by attempting
to uncover and publicize hidden information about the design and operation
of Trojan, and the nuclear fuel cycle in general. This included efforts
throughout the plant's lifetime to develop opportunities for intervention in
administrative proceedings, government hearings, and other arenas which
often discourage citizen involvement. Related to the public debate over
Trojan were ongoing operational difficulties and changing economic
conditions, which contributed to the decision PGE announced in 1993 that
Trojan would be permanently shut down.
This study is based primarily on coverage from newspapers and
periodicals, new and extant oral history interviews, documents from the
personal files of activists, as well as various archival materials associated
with PGE, activist groups, and government agencies.
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Introduction
Commuters traveling along U.S. Highway 30 or 1-5 approximately thirty
miles northwest of Portland are accustomed to an imposing sight: the 499-foot
cooling tower that remains standing where it functioned as part of Portland
General Electric's Trojan nuclear power plant from 1976 to 1993. In several
important ways, the tower is a monument. As it dominates the landscape --
looming over the surrounding town of Rainier, Oregon , the nearby Columbia
River landscape, and the public park that now occupies the Trojan site -- it is a
marker of what many in the energy industry once thought of as one of the
great achievements of nuclear engineering.
At the time of its construction, Trojan was the largest commercial
nuclear power ever built. Today, the tower marks a significant failure.
Although the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) licensed Trojan to run for forty
years, Portland General Electric (PGE) decided to shut the plant down after
less than seventeen years. It was the largest U.S. nuclear power plant ever
decommissioned.1 Finally, the tower that made Trojan such an impressive
sight remains as a monument to environmentalism in the Pacific Northwest.
Had it not been for pressure from a number of groups concerned about the
impact of the plant on the temperature of the Columbia River, PGE would have
preferred the far simpler process of "once-through" cooling and would not have
included the cooling tower in Trojan 's engineering plans.2
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At its root, the conflict over commercial nuclear power in the Pacific
Northwest, to a great extent initiated by the dispute over the Trojan plant, was
a conflict between two opposing views of how society should ensure a
promising future . One side held that it must develop nuclear energy in order to
reach that goal, whereas the other held that a safe and prosperous future
would only be attained when society protected its environment by eliminating
the risks that nuclear technology involved. These views of social progress
correspond to conflicting notions of economy. One is the socially dominant
notion embodied by modern capitalism and counter to this is a related group of
other conceptions embedded in variety of poetic, political and philosophical
traditions.
Henry David Thoreau's Walden inaugurated a concept of economy that
prefigured the development of modern ecological praxis in the United States in
the twentieth century. In his classic cultural study The Machine in the Garden,
Leo Marx explored the ways these sets of ideals have defined how people in
the United States have conceived of their nation's landscape, society and
future. 3 For Marx, the "pastoral" ideal conceived of society as a garden, a kind
of middle-ground between the domains of art and nature, while the
"progressive" ideal was characterized by belief in the promise of technological
progress. These ideals, which have conflicted in the United States since the
advent of the industrial revolution , lie at the basis of the ongoing
disagreements over nuclear power and environmental principles.
This study will consider the Trojan conflict, what it meant to residents
of Oregon, and why it remains significant today against the background of
these two conflicting visions in U.S. culture. The history of the Trojan conflict
is of vital interest not only because of the specific elements it touches upon --
the influence of the plant itself in the region, the reasons for its failure, the
effect on the utility and the regional economy, and the impact of these events
on the environmental movement -- but also because these elements broadly
illustrate different values and ideals, and the social divides that exist between
them.
Within this broad framework, this thesis will examine the environmental
organizations that were actively opposed to Trojan, the ideas and experiences
of key activists within them, and the extent to which their anti-nuclear activities
succeeded in attaining their goal of defeating Trojan and in developing an
environmental-political praxis -- a set of actions or practices based in a
coherent set of ideas that in turn further the evolution of the original concepts .
The first chapter of this work opens with a pre-Trojan history, both of
PGE in the post-World War II period and the Northwest environmental
movement on the threshold of the age of nuclear power. This segment then
traces the origins and development of PGE's nuclear program, including the
construction of Trojan, as well as the emergence of the conflict over the
utility's plans. It considers a number of significant events and changes in this
period that help to explain the ideological and political conflict over Trojan and
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shows that as environmental activists struggled to build up a viable anti-
Trojan movement and journalists and interveners raised safety questions
about the plant, PGE undertook a variety of public relations efforts in
response.
The second chapter explores in greater detail the development and
organization of activism in response to Trojan, beginning with forerunners
such as the Oregon Environmental Council and continuing with profiles of two
key anti-Trojan activists who greatly determined the course of opposition to
nuclear power in the Northwest during the Trojan era. In the context of PGE's
early difficulties operating Trojan, this chapter documents and explores the
efforts of the Trojan Decommissioning Alliance to mount a series of direct-
action sit-ins.
The third chapter then outlines changes and rifts in the anti-Trojan
movement as it continued to pursue every possible avenue of legal and
political involvement. It also considers key events, such as the company's
1978 announcement that the plant did not meet federal earthquake standards
as well as the Three Mile Island accident, and their impact on the Trojan
dispute. Following the disintegration of much of the organized opposition to
the plant in the 1980s, the third chapter explores how anti-Trojan activities,
including protests and ballot measures to close the facility, continued up to,
and beyond , PGE's 1993 announcement that the plant would remain
permanently closed.
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The conclusion to the thesis brings together a final assessment of both
sides of the conflict. It includes a consideration of the values tactics and, ,
effectiveness of nuclear power proponents and critics and an overview of how
this history adds to a broader political analysis of the Pacific Northwest.
This study is based primarily on coverage from a variety of newspapers,
periodicals, and newsletters; new and extant oral history interviews;
documents from the personal files of activists; and various materials
associated with Portland General Electric, activist groups, and government
agencies derived from the Stanley Parr Archives, the Oregon State Archives,
the Oregon Historical Society Research Library, and the Millar Library at
Portland State University. Additionally, William Nichols, a professor of English
and Environmental Studies at Denison University, has graciously provided an
unpublished manuscript on the subject of Trojan dating from 1981 as well as
transcripts of numerous interviews he conducted in the course of his research,
including several with representatives of Portland General Electric. During the
research of the current study, active or retired employees of PGE were not
available for interview. The utility has also closed its research library and the
company's records are not currently available to researchers.
,Chapter 1
Trojan's Arrival and the Seeds of Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Northwest
To understand Portland General Electric's determination to become a
leading supplier of nuclear energy and the company's decisions relating to the
Trojan plant, it is important to consider the changes in the corporation during
the period following World War II. In the years between the end of the war and
1960, the birthrate, population, and gross national product of the United States
grew drastically, and the Pacific Northwest offered no exception to these
trends. Population in the region increased from 3.3 million in 1940 to 5.2
million by 1960. As the population of the Northwest multiplied so did
consumption of goods and energy per capita.1 Both commercial and domestic
energy consumption soared in the 1950s and '60s as regional power suppliers
promoted electricity for every imaginable use? This meant a growing need not
only for residential electrical service but also power to fuel the rapid industrial
and commercial growth.
When PGE and other suppliers were unable to construct new facilities
and expand existing ones quickly enough, brownouts resulted in Central
Oregon in 1947. Polls revealed widespread concern among the business
community and the public at large about power shortages and the potential
harm they could inflict on economic development in the region.3 Political
pressure for the construction of new hydroelectric dams, amplified by the
disastrous Vanport flood of 1948, resulted in the passage of the Flood Control
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Act of 1950.4 This legislation permitted the Army Corps of Engineers to
proceed with a multitude of dams along the Columbia River.
Even in 1949, however, it was not imperative that PGE build new dams
in order to remedy the regional power shortage. A solution to the crisis was
already on the horizon, as both the McNary Dam -- on the Columbia river near
Umatilla, Oregon -- and the addition of additional turbines to the Coulee Dam
-- also on the Columbia river in north-central Washington -- were both
underway.5 Yet executives at PGE had been planning a long-range strategy
for the company, which they believed required a vast expansion of its
generating capacity. Their purpose was not merely to develop new facilities in
order to add to the base power supply but to add to the company's ability to
control the flow of power in the region. PGE previously had served as a small
retail supplier of power purchased largely from the Bonneville Power
Administration -- a New Deal federal agency founded in 1937 that marketed
wholesale power to smaller utilities. The company boasted in the 1940s that it
was the leading supplier in the regional power system and it endeavored to
become a leading producer.6
With these aims at the forefront of its agenda, PGE pushed forward in
1949 with plans to build a new dam on the "Pelton" site on the Deschutes
River, near Madras, Oregon, in Jefferson County. Because of the controversy
over how the Pelton Project would affect migrating populations of salmon and
trout, however, the dam became the center of an exceedingly complex,
protracted struggle -- involving PGE, the Federal Power Commission, the
Warm Springs tribe, the Oregon Fish and Game commissions, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Oregon Hydroelectric Commission, and
both commercial and sport fishing interests -- that continued for nearly a
decade before it was secure and operating.
There was a stark contrast between PGE's public relations posturing
about the Pelton Project's impact on fish and its statements to the Oregon
Hydroelectric Commission. In its brochure, "Oregon Needs the Pelton Power
Project," the company mentioned the need to develop power, "and still
preserve a fishing resource of great value both commercially and
recreationally.,,7 It also provided a few brief details of the new hatchery ,
presumably as evidence of the company's good faith with respect to fish
preservation . However, in its statements to the Hydroelectric Commission,
PGE discussed the hatchery as if it was only so much red tape. The company
dismissed the value of any anadromous fish that might exist, saying that "the
benefits from the migration of fish are wholly speculative and based on a
nebulous hope that the propagation of salmon may become successful in this
particular stream at some uncertain future. ,,8 Statements by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service painted an entirely different picture. The Service
described in detail how the dam's construction would place in jeopardy some
680,000 pounds per year of anadromous fish then migrating on the
Deschutes.9 PGE's statements about the dam and its environmental impact
JIi- _
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revealed a company that was eager to advance its construction plans and
was dismissive of opponents' concern, but also careful to guard its corporate
image. The company executives' strong belief in the rightness of their
construction and generation strategies with Pelton was a prominent feature of
the "culture" at PGE that shaped the manner in which the firm pursued Trojan.
In the background of the company's actions was its goal of progressing from a
mere supplier to a leading producer in the energy industry.
The Pelton conflict also revealed that PGE possessed extraordinary
determination. After two years of struggle with the state fish commission and
the Oregon Hydroelectric Commission, PGE's partners in the Pelton endeavor
decided to cut their losses and withdrew their investments -- yet the company
showed no intention of discontinuing its construction plans and battled on.
Because the conflict involved both water use, which fell within the purview of
state government, and the federal lands bordering the river, the dispute
between the Oregon Hydroelectric Commission, which opposed Pelton, and
the Federal Power Commission, which favored it, required the U.S. Supreme
Court to settle the problem of state vs. federal jurisdiction. Although the
Court's decision permitted PGE to construct Pelton, U.S. Senator Richard
Neuberger proposed a congressional amendment that would block the dam's
completion. lO After the Neuberger amendment failed, the dam went on line on
May 22, 1958.11
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The Pelton dispute also serves as a striking reminder of the clash of
values that has existed in the background of every debate over technological
development and the environment since the industrial revolution, when new
and existing technologies pervaded broad cross-sections of U.S. society and
posed a challenge of values to the pastoral ideals in which the nation was
rooted. 12 The sets of values at odds in the Pelton dispute pitted a view that
future prosperity depended upon implementation of new technologies against
a view of civilization as a "garden," a natural environment that its inhabitants
could only preserve by protecting it from the risks that new technologies
brought.
Following PGE's executive reorganization in 1948, a new company
president, Thomas Delzell, replaced the entire board of directors. As historian
Craig Wollner wrote in his portrait of the company, these changes constituted
a "complete break with the recent past."13 The corporation progressed into the
post-World War II period strengthened and financially secure. Its vision of
itself as a firm, and as part of its community lay solidly within a set of values
emphasizing technological progress and the responsibility to ensure the
state's power needs. Prior to the postwar construction boom, PGE executives
had been uncertain how long the company could continue to operate in the
capacity of a small-scale retail supplier of electricity from the SPA. The SPA
chiefly provided power to public utilities, and thus private energy firms such as
11
PGE would be last in line and would be first to feel the effects of a power
shortage. As a result, there was a strong possibility that the impending
shortages could lead Oregon residents to seriously question the value of
having a private utility. After the Oregon Legislature passed a bill in 1931
allowing for the formation of people's utility districts (PUDs), four such districts
were formed. 14 Private utilities saw a far more menacing example in the state
of Washington, where PUDs accounted for the majority of the state's electric
needs. Nevertheless, the public power threat diminished greatly for PGE
when the company signed a twenty-year contract with the SPA in 1953.15
In 1952, the Truman Administration 's Paley Commission urged
"aggressive research" in solar energy, an area in which "the U.S. could make
an immense contribution to the welfare of the whole world . The commission
estimated that such efforts could heat 13 million homes and offices by 1975.16
However, the federal government did not implement the recommendations
and by the following year had undertaken what became a decades-long push
toward nuclear energy. As large chemical companies started to research
ways of using atomic power commercially, the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) undertook similar studies. In early 1954 President Dwight D.
Eisenhower began to outline an "Atoms for Peace" program for commercial
nuclear power. 17 It was with the U.S. government's implementation of
Eisenhower's initiatives that the nuclear machine fully entered the garden .
12
PGE was compelled make plans for its future once the BPA contract
was due to expire in 1973, and the company made nuclear power research
part of its agenda from the beginning stages of these atomic energy initiatives.
As consumption of electricity continued to grow steadily in the postwar period ,
PGE remained fearful that the regional hydroelectric system was no longer
able to produce a broad surplus of power to share among the utilities . The
company's 1968 Annual Report announced a major shift toward thermal
generation of which nuclear power would "inevitably" be "a major factor.,,18
According to Bart Withers, who came to PGE in 1974 and served as vice
president of its nuclear division, the company feared being cut off from the
BPA and decided to continue to develop its own generating facilities. 19 PGE
saw a need to take "a really big step forward ," Withers said . He went on to
explain that "there was a lot of faith by people in responsible positions at that
time that nuclear power was the coming thing." The construction of one or
more nuclear plants offered PGE a way to secure a source of power for itself,
regulate rates, and develop the firm into a major producer of electricity in
Oregon.
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment when PGE formally decided
to actively pursue construction of its first nuclear plant. It is likely that PGE's
extensive research on nuclear power options went on so long that, eventually,
the company's management decided that it was past the point of no return
with respect to developing nuclear power; a plant would be built. In addition to
13
PGE's contributions to the research and development efforts of utilities
across the country, it employed Bechtel, a large engineering firm located in
San Francisco, to conduct studies of potential sites, mostly in the Willamette
Valley. For a period of roughly five years, the company evaluated possible
locations on the basis of proximity to rail and water transportation, access to
cooling water and to labor, geological and seismological features, and other
criteria. In February 1967 PGE announced its decision to build a 1-miliion-kW
nuclear plant and in May chose a site near Rainier, Oregon, which geologists
and engineers from Bechtel deemed to be completely satisfactory.2o The
location had previously been the site of an explosives warehouse of the Trojan
Powder Company, and PGE decided the plant would bear the Trojan name.
The selection of a site on the Columbia River immediately aroused
concern by organizations from within the environmental movement and the
commercial fishing trade fearful of the effect of cooling turbine condensers
directly with river water. As a result, new water quality standards enacted by
the Oregon State Sanitary Authority (later to become the Department of
Environmental Quality) prohibited utilities from discharging water into the river
when its temperature was above 68 degrees Fahrenheit. This policy prompted
PGE's October 1968 decision to add a $13 million cooling tower to the plant
facilities .21
In October 1970, while PGE was in the midst of engineering, site
preparation, government licensing, and training of personnel , the company
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also settled the plant's ownership: the Eugene Water and Electric Board
would have a 30 percent share, the Pacific Power & Light Company 2.5
percent, and PGE would retain controlling ownership with 67.5 percent. 22
Meanwhile, PGE continued to voice concern over energy shortages. In 1971
President Frank Warren predicted that by 1979-80 PGE would have an energy
deficit of 652,OOO-kilowatt hours, which was twice the amount needed to serve
a city the size of Salem.23 Citing these concerns and its faith in the promise of
nuclear technology, Warren reinforced the firm 's position as a regional leader
in the shift to nuclear power, telling the Oregon Nuclear and Thermal Energy
Council that "time was of the essence. The need for a second nuclear power
plant by 1979 is very, very critical. ,,24
Although Trojan's one million kilowatt capacity was triple that of the
Round Butte hydroelectric project, which had been PGE's largest generating
plant, Trojan merely marked the beginning of the company's "big step
forward." The firm 's projections of limitless increases in electricity
consumption in the foreseeable future were shared by numerous regional
utilities (such as those in the Washington Public Power Supply System) and
government agencies, many of which proclaimed in 1966 and '67 that nuclear
generating facilities of one million kilowatt capacity or higher would be required
at the rate of approXimately one per year beginning in the next decade.25
.......
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In future years nuclear critics frequently would charge that the AEC
was an active promoter of nuclear power instead of a mere regulatory agency.
Indeed, a prevailing idea of the AEC was that nuclear energy offered the
promise of the fulfillment of a new culture based on ever-increasing energy
consumption. Speaking to the San Francisco elite at the Commonwealth Club
in 1968, AEC Chairman Glenn Seaberg observed that "this great social,
cultural industrial complex that has blossomed here on the West Coast is in
the real sense of the word a 'High Energy Society.' [It is] a truly modern
technological culture whose measure of advancement can almost be equated
to its consumption of energy. ,,26 Shared by many in the AEC and in the
nuclear industry, such a view formed part of the progressive technological
ideal that drove the pursuit of commercial nuclear power.
Before the mid-1960s only a small outcry over the nation's move toward
commercial nuclear power had surfaced,27 The environmental effects of
uranium mining and purification remained largely unknown at this time and not
enough radioactive waste had accumulated to push the problem of storage
onto the agendas of environmental organizations.28 For these reasons the
vast majority of those involved in environmental issues during those decades
viewed nuclear power as not only a favorable alternative to fossil fuels but as a
positive means for a growing population to save its environment. In 1966 Will
Siri , the director of the Sierra Club and a biophysicist at the University of
16
California, called nuclear power "one of the chief long-term hopes for
conservation," adding that "cheap energy in unlimited quantities is one of the
chief factors in allowing a rapidly growing population to preserve wildlands,
open space, and lands of scenic value. "29
In Trojan's lifetime, the vast majority of anti-nuclear activism involved
members of local, grassroots environmental organizations, as opposed to
national, mainstream groups such as the Sierra Club. These groups must be
understood within the context of the emergence of the environmental
movement in the twentieth century. In Forcing the Spring (1993), Robert
Gottlieb, a professor of environmental policy and analysis in the Urban
Planning Program at UCLA, has set out a number of historical distinctions
between different segments of the environmental movement.30 As a whole,
environmentalism arose as an expression of the pastoral ideal and in
response to industrial development in the East and the large-scale expansion
of the U.S. economy into the western territories after the 1880s. For Gottlieb,
this response manifested itself in separate but related areas of the
environmental movement: the public health movement exemplified by Alice
Hamilton -- a professor at Harvard Medical School , social reformer, and
pioneer of the fields of occupational and public health -- and the wilderness
preservation movement exemplified by Sierra Club founder and naturalist John
Muir.
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Key transformations within the environmental movement took place
in the years following World War II. Historian Samuel P. Hays has observed
that rapid industrialization, urban and suburban growth, an increase in the
standard of living, and rising education levels occurred in the United States
after the war fostered environmental values by prompting more people to
change their consumption habits to fit the new standard of living and to make
greater efforts to improve community life, health and well-being. 31 A parallel
trend in the conservation movement was a shift away from the "commodity
values" of resource conservation toward "environmental values" those that
prized entire environmental systems such as the nation's wildlands for the
beauty and amenities they offered. These shifts led to greater social concern
over toxicity and the preservation of human health, including growing anxiety
over the problems of potential nuclear accidents and the disposal of
radioactive waste, which prompted the Nixon administration to enact several
environmental reforms after 1968. Among these was the National
Environmental Policy Act, which required agencies to report details of the
environmental effects of major developments before proceeding with them.
These changes in social and political context and the ideological
framing of environmental issues and their influence were accompanied by
transitions in the makeup and activities of environmental organizations.
According to Gottlieb, mainstream environmental groups that had begun as
recreational associations for the professional class started in the late 1940s to
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develop resource policy, as in the case of the opposition to the Echo Park
hydroelectric project within Dinosaur National Monument along the Colorado-
Utah border.32 At the same time these large organizations became
institutionalized as part of the environmental policymaking process, a multitude
of grassroots environmental groups sprang up across the nation and began
util izing new tactics including boycotts, guerrilla theater, and civil
disobedience.
These trends prefigured much of the history of the anti-nuclear
movement in the 1970s and '80s, including the movement against Trojan.
Indeed, some segments of the anti-Trojan movement derived from the direct
action movement, the subject of Barbara Epstein's Political Protest and
Cultural Revolution (1991 ) .33 The methodology of the direct action movement
included nonviolence, consensus decision-making, and mass civil
disobedience and was exemplified by groups such as the Clamshell Alliance
on the coast of New Hampshire.34 While this methodology was to some extent
rooted in pacifist and civil rights groups such as Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Epstein argued that such an
approach was fully formulated in the anti-nuclear energy campaigns of the
1970s and '80s and later spread to the peace, ecology, and women's
movements.
The emergence of anti-nuclear campaigns, however, involved a slow
and difficult process. Disagreements by activists over nuclear energy -- such
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as the one in the Sierra Club over its endorsement of the plant in Diablo
Canyon, California, in 1966 -- created rifts within the environmental movement,
spinning off new organizations. Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich's bestselling
book The Population Bomb (1968), advanced the claim that unchecked
population growth, enabled by the accessibility of large amounts of cheap
energy, entailed increased pollution and would likely lead to massive die-offs.
Meanwhile, nuclear energy's pollution-free image was shaken by
controversies over the issue of thermal pollution -- the effects of power plants'
discharge of warmer water into water habitats.
Doubt spread in environmental and sporting organizations that had
once supported nuclear power when the AEC asserted that it lacked the
jurisdiction to respond to the thermal pollution problem, which it attempted to
trivialize by euphemistically referring to it as "thermal enrichment." Activist
charges that the AEC had a fundamental conflict of interest as both a promoter
and regulator of nuclear energy intensified as a result of the thermal pollution
debate, and in 1968 many media outlets began reporting for the first time on
the harmful side-effects of nuclear power -- an extension of the general fear
that had been prominent since the 1940s over the threat of nuclear weapons
and their effects.35 The first Earth Day in 1970 strengthened burgeoning anti-
nuclear sentiment immeasurably by diversifying and galvaniZing the broader
environmental movement. Still , in cases where large protest movements
formed in response to new nuclear projects -- those in Seabrook, New
20
Hampshire, and Diablo Canyon, for example -- the movements typically lost
momentum when the plants reached completion and went on line.36
As evidenced by the adoption of stricter state water quality standards
regarding thermal pollution from power plants, the debate over the
environmental impact of nuclear power raged in the Northwest just as PGE
announced its plans for Trojan, resulting in stricter water quality standards
requiring construction of the cooling tower at Trojan. Anthony Netboy, then an
assistant professor of English at Portland State College, published two articles
in national magazines about thermal pollution in the Columbia and the
potential threat of Trojan to salmon runs.37 As it had elsewhere, the outcry
over thermal pollution furthered skepticism about the AEC and fed concern
about the potentially harmful effects of Trojan, both of which strengthened the
growing regional anti-nuclear movement. The Oregonian, which normally
published little that put Trojan in a negative light, was moved to briefly strike a
watchdog pose with respect to the utilities. "As matters stand," an editorial
proclaimed in 1967, "the utilities are making the decisions. The people of
Oregon would be unwise to disregard the approaching problems of thermal
pollution and to depend upon the future decisions of the utilities themselves to
act when conditions become acute." The editors stated that although the
effect of Oregon's first commercial nuclear plant might be negligible by itself,
21
"new sources of pollution should be prevented, not allowed to grow to the
acute stage.,,38
The most serious opposition to Trojan surfaced in 1970, roughly two
years after construction of the facility began, when a small group of middle-
aged activists founded the Coalition for Safe Power (CSp).39 Initially called
Citizens for Safe Power, the group's genesis came as PGE was in the midst of
the elaborate process of obtaining construction permits from various
government agencies and an operating license from the AEC.
Representatives from CSP attended hearings, circulated petitions, and made
efforts to publish and circulate information about the risks associated'with
Trojan. In 1974 CSP would sponsor a 1DO-mile walk from Portland to
Longview, Washington, and back to spread information about nuclear power
and energy alternatives, all of which was covered in the "underground"
Portland Scribe. 40
Another forum for these efforts was the Willamette Bridge, an
alternative underground weekly founded by Portland activists and published
between 1968 and 1971. A series of Bridge articles acknowledged that there
was little hope of preventing government agencies from licensing Trojan but
that it was imperative to spread information about the environmental effects
the plant would have. PGE responded in 1970 with extensive public relations
campaign asserting the environmental benefits of nuclear energy through
advertisements in Oregon newspapers and mailed pamphlets to ratepayers.
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Coverage in the Bridge countered these materials point-by-point and argued
that instead of helping residential customers improve their standard of living
through abundant electricity, the utility would end up selling the majority of the
plant's energy to business, industry, and California utilities. The risks
assumed by Oregon residents, a story in the newspaper charged, were
numerous: climate change as a result of large quantities of vapor from the
plant, radioactive contamination resulting from the AEC's lax safety levels,
toxicity associated with the problem of radioactive waste disposal, and the risk
of damage to the reactor in the event of an earthquake.41
In December 1970 nine members of CSP met with GovernorTom
McCall, a supporter of Trojan, to discuss a report from the AEC which the
group believed raised serious questions about the safety of the plant.
Members of the organization also attended AEC licensing hearings. "The
purpose of the hearings escaped me," one member of the Coalition wrote,
because "PGE and the AEC have been in consultation for years over an
acceptable plan." Furthermore, "the AEC can issue a construction permit for
Trojan even if the plans do not meet up to the AEC's safety standards."
Regardless of such a bleak outlook, CSP maintained opposition to Trojan for
the influence it might have on nuclear projects planned for the future. "The
Trojan is a test case," a Coalition member reported, citing AEC plans to
license nuclear plants equivalent to 700 Trojans by the year 2000.42
23
According to Jane Reitz of CSP, "the most critical problem" facing
Oregon nuclear power opponents in the late 1960s and early '70s was "public
ignorance." In an attempt to reverse this problem, the organization conducted
an extensive public outreach campaign, which included information tables at
colleges and in supermarkets as well as presentations to school classes and
church groupS.43 In response to House Bill 1065, designed to grease the
wheels for state approval of nineteen other Oregon nuclear plants by 1986,
the Coalition for Safe Power collected 23,000 signatures in 1970 on a petition
that called for a four-year moratorium on construction of atomic facilities .
Another petition, signed by 300 health care professionals, urged Governor
McCall to halt the construction of Trojan on the grounds that radioactive
contamination of the Portland area would lead to increases in cancer and birth
defects.44
The actions of Citizens for Safe Power throughout the period of Trojan's
licensing were those of an organization fighting an uphill battle, aware that
nothing short of massive opposition from Oregon residents at-large would
succeed in halting Trojan. Moreover, as CSP employed conventional
strategies-intervention at hearings, petitions, public outreach-some activists
began to feel that only direct resistance would be able to disrupt what
appeared to them to be a perfunctory licensing process. An article by Michael
O'Brien in the Willamette Bridge pointed out that "the futility of struggling within
24
a political system dominated by corporations like PGE has undoubtedly led
some people to consider more desperate actions.,,45
Some activists were intent on demonstrating that the very survival of
the Northwest was at stake. Seeking to use worst-case scenarios in order to
spread information about the risks of nuclear power, some manifested these
scenarios in terms of prophecy.46 In a poem titled "The Trojan Nuclear Power
Plant Hearing," Barbara la Morticella -- a local poet who later achieved
regional acclaim, especially among activists -- suggested that the machine-in-
garden conflict would resolve itself through a natural comeuppance:
All these men with shirts and ties-
Who would ever guess
There are earth people, air people,
Fire people, water people
Gathered in this room.
Men who've forgotten their very natures
Who are going to split the atom.
On the frieze outside, the star
Of empire leads, while a horse
Tramples on an Indian woman's foot.
Only the atom knows what its nature is
And while men talk and buds open in the rain
The atoms of the earth and air and fire and water
Gather and wait and quietly contain
The moment when, shattering, they'll reveal
Their ultimate enlightenment for
Arrogant men.47
La Morticella's poem elucidated the opposition between active
proponents of nuclear technology in government and industry and those who
identified foremost with elements of nature, those largely outside government
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proceedings and the board meetings of large corporations. Nevertheless
some opponents of Trojan and nuclear power were impressively credentialed
scientists and engineers who at some stage of their careers had become
critical of nuclear power. Barry Commoner, one of the world's most well-
known biologists during the 1970s, was involved with civilian and military uses
of nuclear technology beginning with World War II's Manhattan Project but did
not become actively concerned about commercial nuclear power until nearly
thirty years later. Commoner asserted that Eisenhower created his "Atoms for
Peace" program merely to lend credibility to Cold War policies and that "the
government never developed nuclear power out of a coherent analysis of the
energy question ... because all they were interested in were bombs.,,48
David Lilienthal was another prominent member of the federal nuclear
program. In the years immediately following World War II, Lilienthal served as
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and was a leading proponent of
government-sponsored civilian nuclear power plants, particularly in the
Columbia River Valley. Subsequently, the former administrator came to
oppose nuclear power because of its inherent hazards and the grave risks of
human error it brought. John Gofman was another AEC scientist who, while
generally supporting nuclear power, became an outspoken critic of what he
considered lax AEC safety standards. The Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists,
representing the voices of dissident atomic physicists and chemists, was also
generally critical of commercial nuclear power plants.49 However, despite
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such exceptions, people from the nuclear regulatory apparatus and the
scientific community generally remained committed to nuclear power
throughout the 1970s and '80s.
One expert who sided with the anti-Trojan movement was Ivan Bloch,
an engineer specializing in energy resources who served as chief of the
Division of Industrial Resources and Development of the SPA from 1938 to
1947. There he was responsible for bringing aluminum and other chemical
industries to the Pacific Northwest to take advantage of inexpensive
hydroelectric power.50 Ironically, these same industries became major energy
consumers in the region and contributed to the utilities' push toward nuclear
power, which Bloch vehemently opposed.51 Predicting that engineering flaws
would hinder the operation of Trojan, Bloch wrote in 1971 that there had been
no indication of how local agencies would monitor and supervise the design
and manufacture of reactor components which PGE purchased from energy
firms elsewhere in the country. "This is crucial," he wrote, "because it involves
a general rule that no product of highly developed technology can be any
better than each detail of its execution."52
Aside from the plant's reactor, another contested area of Trojan's
design was site geology. Initial warnings about the possibility of earthquakes
in the region came out in hearings on Trojan's potential risks, held in March
1971, after the AEC granted PGE construction approval. One witness on the
II
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opposition side was a geologist at Portland State University named Leonard
Palmer, who had just completed a study of a recent earthquake in the Los
Angeles area, which he noted had destroyed a number of "earthquake-proof'
buildings. Trojan was designed to withstand quakes of 8.0 on the Richter
scale and "accelerations" of 0.25 times the force of gravity, he said. Noting
that the Los Angeles quake had measured only 6.25 on the Richter scale but
had produced accelerations of 1.0 times the force of gravity, Palmer concluded
that Trojan could be exposed to earthquakes larger than it could withstand and
that construction should be postponed because "geologists don't know enough
about acceleration." Palmer claimed that "no detailed map" of Trojan's site
geology had been completed but that his own survey revealed that there were
"faults going through the foundations." In 1971, however, geologists had little
understanding of plate tectonics, and Palmer defined faults as possible "lines
of ground breakage."s3
The earthquake problem was central to the Oregon Environmental
Council's 1971 attempt to get a court ruling appeal of the AEC construction
permit for Trojan. The OEC, a non-profit group founded in 1968, was
Oregon's first statewide environmental organization. In response to the
charge that PGE had not done sufficient environmental research, PGE nuclear
plant engineer Don Broehl responded that "any crack in a rock can be
considered a fault" but that there was "no reason to reasonably suspect
faulting of the type that would effect [sic] the integrity of the project."S4
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Although the OEC suit was ultimately unsuccessful in halting Trojan's
construction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that
the AEC had made a "mockery" of the National Environmental Policy Act in its
licensing procedures for nuclear plants. When the Commission restructured
its environmental impact review regulations in September 1971, the court ruled
that it must reexamine the environmental impact of all such plants being built.
However, the AEC determined that it would not be necessary to halt
construction pending the new review and, of all the plants in progress
nationally, it selected Trojan as the first to resume erection.55
One principal source of evidence anti-Trojan activists used to identify
the faults running through the Trojan site was the U.S. Geological Survey, a
division of the Department of the Interior. Ironically, Secretary of the Interior
Rogers Morton visited the Trojan site in 1971 and after being briefed by PGE
officials observed that "this probably represents the most carefully thought out
nuclear plant from an environmental viewpoint that's ever been designed."
Morton dismissed fears of radioactivity with the explanation that "there's
always that kind of reaction with these sort [sic] of developments.,,56
The main achievement of environmentalists in the early 1970s was to
raise questions about the environmental risks of nuclear plants and to sustain
the debate over Trojan. The controversy received national attention in 1972
when a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal placed it within the context
of other nuclear scandals and confrontations across the nation and reported
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several events behind the scenes of the licensing process that cast doubt
on the AEC and the utility industry's regard for public welfare. First, Raymond
Corcoran, the Oregon state government's geologist, wrote a five-page report
in late 1970 that expressed uncertainties about the geologic integrity of the
site and stating he needed more scientific studies before he could rule on the
matter. Corcoran's superiors "ordered all copies of the memo returned and
destroyed" and issued a new memo stating that the State Department of
Geology was not in a position to submit an opinion on the Trojan site due to a
lack of resources. 57
Second, John Ziegler, an engineer at Bechtel , the principal contractor
for Trojan, contacted the AEC in late 1970 with what he believed to be a major
safety flaw in Trojan's cooling pumps. After convincing Ziegler that it would be
preferable to conduct an "in-house" investigation of the problem, Bechtel
asked the AEC to return the letter unopened. The AEC complied. Ziegler was
later fired and claimed that "the full-scale, in-house investigation turned out to
be a farce. I realized I had been had." Peter Karpa, who headed Bechtel's
Trojan design team, dismissed Ziegler's concerns and asserted that "the plant
meets all safety rules the AEC lays down.... When you have a set of laws on
the books, you hope the lawmakers know what they're doing.,,58
Third, Portland State University geologists Gilbert T. Benson and Len
Palmer recommended a "boomer survey" (the use of sonic wave data) of the
area of the Columbia River neighboring the site to confirm the existence of the
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fault projected by the U.S. Geological Survey. "The Trojan site is too close
to the Portland metropolitan area to be approved on the basis of anything less
than a full and satisfactory investigation," they asserted. PGE later denied that
they had conducted a boomer survey of the Trojan site, possibly because they
feared the impression that such evidence might give. When a California-
based engineering firm claimed that it had conducted such an assessment for
PGE in 1967, the company promised to look for a copy of the sonic echo data
but later responded that they were inconclusive and had been lost,59 In spite
of such doubts, the AEC granted PGE a license for Trojan because the
commission then had no seismic standards for nuclear plants, even though
seismology had factored heavily in a controversy about the siting of another
nuclear plant five years earlier.5o
In response to critical reports, PGE fought to protect its image by
blaming looming energy shortages on environmentalists. Warnings of power
deficiencies rose to public prominence during the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Yet
the curtailment of imported Arab oil was equivalent to only 7 percent of U.S. oil
consumption-enough of a reduction to create headaches for retail gasoline
consumers but not enough to strangle the economy.51 Although there were
fuel shortages, the harm that accompanied them largely took the form of
psychological uncertainty. The embargo in fact had no long-term negative
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effects and the short-term impact was kept to a relatively harmless level by
virtue of alternate sources of oil.52
The price hikes, however, were indeed a separate phenomenon, which
aided both oil companies and producers. Evidence internal to the government
and the energy industry neatly dispels the common belief that the higher
prices were a punitive measure originating from hostile Arab states.53 Most
high-ranking government officials predicted higher prices but spoke in favor of
them.54 U.S. energy companies themselves had been calling for price
increases, and there is evidence that they worked with the U.S government to
achieve higher rates.55 According to some estimates, the oil companies
reaped an additional $420 billion in 1973 because of increased prices.55
As widespread anger spread across the United States over higher
prices and energy shortages, the nuclear industry attempted to focus the
problem on environmentalists, even though they had not yet succeeded in
sloWing the proliferation of new plants. Yet as electricity rates went up and
profits soared, many became angry at the government and the energy industry
rather than environmentalists and undertook drastic conservation efforts rather
than calling for relaxed environmental standards. By 1974, utilities began to
realize they had overestimated the number of nuclear facilities that would be
profitable, and the financial consequences of decreasing demand for electricity
forced them to cancel a large percentage of the facilities they had ordered .
These developments opened the perfect opportunity for the anti-nuclear
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movement, and the environmental movement at large, to make its greatest
strides yet.67
To many at PGE, the determination with which the antinuclear
movement undertook its efforts was based on ignorance or even
maliciousness. From President Frank Warren down to the technicians who
staffed Trojan's control room, the company was characterized by long-held
ideals of technological progress. The Trojan plant was not only a milestone in
the achievements of engineering, according to PGE, it was a contribution to a
thriving regional economy and a key source of abundant electricity to which
everyone in the United States was entitled . Therefore, anyone who would
oppose Trojan was at best woefully misinformed about nuclear power and at
worst hostile to the fulfillment of the "American dream." In a candid statement
in response to a customer letter inquiring about the nuclear power debate
Roland Gabel, a manager at PGE, replied that, in his view, opponents of
nuclear power
belong to a different political philosophy than Americans do and are
doing things like preventing needed electrical energy [in order] to
destroy our country. If I were on the other side, I'd follow their footprints
of destruction exactly. First, I'd get all our kids to use drugs and dress
like tramps ... then I'd start a campaign to convince the populace that
nuclear power is a killer. With youth and dwindling energy resources ,
we'd be ripe for destruction.68
Although Gabel was not speaking on behalf of PGE, his view was echoed by
many leaders of the utility industry regionally and nationally.69
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As is typical in many areas that involve specialized knowledge, many
who worked in the field of nuclear power believed that laypersons lacked the
requisite expertise to qualify to speak about nuclear technology. Thus the
dismissive attitudes at PGE about the validity of outsiders' views of nuclear
power were directed not only toward activists but by the early '80s to the
citizenry at large as well. PGE devoted substantial resources to project a
positive image of Trojan and to overcome the perceived ignorance and fear
about the plant. In addition to its routine public relations work, the company
constructed and maintained a Visitors Information Center on the Trojan site
filled with exhibits, games, and presentations that instructed about the plant
and its equipment. William Nichols, a professor of English and environmental
studies at Denison University, studied Trojan's Visitors Center and the ways
that schools tended to utilize class tours of the center and school
presentations by its staff -- of which there were over 800 in 1979, a typical
year. His research found little evidence that teachers supplemented these
programs with additional material. Thus the Trojan Visitors Center operated
as a primary source of nuclear education in the region and garnered criticism
from several journalists and scholars as a source of misleading propaganda
and unfair dismissals of anti-nuclear positions.7o
Another public relations program involved the chair of nuclear
engineering at Oregon State University, directly endowed by the same utilities
that had invested in Trojan. PGE thus possessed a highly advantageous
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position in the area of education regarding nuclear issues in a region that,
according to public opinion polls it sponsored, already overwhelmingly favored
nuclear power. According to a 1975 poll of Oregon residents conducted for
PGE by an outside firm, 66 percent of those surveyed were in favor of the
Trojan plant, 23 percent were opposed, and 11 percent were undecided. The
poll also showed that a margin of more than 2 to 1 supported further
development of nuclear plants in the state.71
Perhaps because of these advantages and the company's own belief in
the rightness of its nuclear endeavor, PGE was caught off guard by the
gradual development of an organized opposition to Trojan backed by those
Oregon residents who were increasingly suspicion of nuclear power. Yet in
the mid-1970's, although the growing environmental movement was raising
questions about nuclear power, the utilities were forced to abandon planned
nuclear projects through financial factors rather than political ones. The anti-
nuclear movement's task was to continue and intensify the nuclear debate, to
push it into new arenas, and eventually to bring sufficient public pressure to
bear on the nuclear industry to hasten its demise.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 22, 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(formerly the AEC) granted Trojan's operating license. Exactly a month later,
the facility began producing power in a series of tests. On May 20, 1976,
Trojan officially went into commercial operation. After numerous construction
delays and a final cost that, at $460 million, was roughly double PGE's initial
projections, Trojan's completion provided a distinctive victory for Oregon's
leading private utility. Yet many in the fledgling anti-Trojan movement were
not ready to admit defeat.
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Chapter 2
The Development of Anti-Nuclear Activism:
Legal Intervention and Direct Action
The moment Trojan went on line marked a significant victory for
commercial nuclear power in the Pacific Northwest. The facility was now a
formal part of the local economy and infrastructure and undoing it presented
activists with a much greater task than preventing its opening. As Nina Bell, one
of the major opponents of Trojan, has observed, people generally tend to accept
the status quo.1 Those "living next to an operating nuclear power plant ... are
more likely to accept it than to accept a new one being constructed." "If citizens
wanted to stop it in droves," she stated, "the time would have been a lot earlier.,,2
Stopping the facility, however, had seemed an impossible task to many
critics of the plant long before it opened. Portland General Electric's plans for
nuclear energy already had a great deal of momentum at the time the company
announced Trojan and it took several years before the opposition developed the
forcefulness and know-how to effectively respond. Prior to Trojan's opening,
many of its most active critics were not opposed to atomic energy per se but
merely wanted to make it safer. This "safeguards movement" provides a
necessary context in which to understand the activities of those who organized
to shut down the plant after it began operation.
The floundering efforts of the movement to express its views in a way that
would be taken seriously by others were clearly evident in early
37
discussions about the plant. One of the first of these was Governor
McCall's Nuclear Plant Siting Task Force hearings held in St. Helens on July
2, 1970. At the time PGE built Trojan, there was no clearly defined state role
in regulating nuclear power. A proposal to create a state licensing agency with
the authority to approve, reject, or modify private utilities' plans for nuclear
power plants had been defeated in the state legislature in 1969.3 McCall was
a strong believer in nuclear power and called it "the wave of the future" after
deciding that solar and wind energy would not be feasible to meet the state's
demand for energy in the immediate future. 4 Although not required by statute,
McCall voluntarily created the task force to review PGE's plans for Trojan. It is
likely that a large part of the reason he did so was his belief that an airing of
viewpoints would quell fears. It also helped preserve the pro-environmental
image the governor had earned by supporting the state bottle bill and requiring
the Boise Cascade paper mill to comply with Department of Environmental
Quality pollution regulations.
The Task Force was made up of the state geologist and representatives
from an array of health- and environment-related state agencies. The state
geologist was Raymond Corcoran, whose report on the site's potential
geological hazards had been recalled by his superiors in the Department of
Geology. Evident in the hearing, which might have served as an evenhanded
exchange of information and ideas, was a marked difference in tone in the
task force's questioning of PGE representatives and supporters and that of
,
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speakers who criticized the plans for Trojan. Following his presentation,
company Vice President E.C. Itschner responded to a series of technical
questions in a friendly exchange with the task force. However, the first
speaker to criticize PGE's plans, Dr. Robert Bacon of the University of Oregon
Medical School, faced a notably more antagonistic discussion. For example,
when Bacon presented findings about the risks of increasing environmental
levels of tritium, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear fuel cycle, the task force
representative from the State Board of Health remarked that he would
personally worry much more about pollution from raw sewage than from
tritium.5
John Gofman, the anti-nuclear side's foremost expert witness, had
spent seven years in part under AEC auspices researching the risks posed by
nuclear plants and began with a review of his qualifications. Following his
statement, task force chairman Larry Wilkinson replied, "Dr. Gofman, I always
question people that open their testimony claiming to be an expert." What
Gofman had actually said was that no one could be sure what radiation's long-
term effects would be. The members of the task force, whose duty was to
hear all points of view and make an informed recommendation to the
governor, proceeded to vigorously cross-examine Gofman in what appeared to
be an effort to cast doubt on his findings.6 The task force's difference in tone
was not lost on Oregon Environmental Council Executive Director Lawrence
Williams, who divided his testimony between offering an extensively
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documented series of questions about the plant and lamenting that the
hearing was meaningless. The task force, he said, seemed "entirely limited to
the role of promoter." To dismiss the question of hazard "out of hand" at that
stage in Trojan's development, he asserted, was akin to "locking the barn door
after the horse has been stolen."?
Evident in Williams's statements was a paradox that captured anti-
Trojan efforts, especially in the period after the plant opened -- that of activists
going through the regulatory process and other establishment channels to
achieve their goals while expressing serious doubts about the efficacy of those
methods.8 "There was this strange sort of dichotomy of 'the system doesn't
work,' 'the system works,' all completely justifiable," Nina Bell has recalled.
"Back then, one could make the licensing process do some good, but it was
also true that it was not going to do that much good."g However, what
generally distinguished Bell and other activists from those who had spoken
against Trojan in 1970 and '71 was an ability to find opportunities to intervene
legally that provided some hope of altering the course of nuclear power in the
region.
PGE's 1971 shareholders' meeting was another example of early
efforts to publicize concerns over nuclear power in spite of a utility that
appeared to hold all the cards. The meeting, far longer and larger than those
of previous years, was conducted behind locked doors, and shareholders were
searched for cameras and tape recorders. Attendees had the opportunity to
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speak but could take no steps to alter PGE's plans because a ruling by the
Oregon Supreme Court concerning another PGE power project had given
President Frank Warren the authority to rule out-of-order any motion he
wished.1o One shareholder, Ann Morgenstern, outlined a detailed set of
problems about the risk of accident and the issues of radioactive waste
transportation and disposal. When these concerns were largely rebuffed by
the utility's speakers, who spoke almost exclusively on the subject of
radioactive emissions from the plant's operation , Morgenstern unsuccessfully
introduced a resolution ordering the company to halt construction and
undertake a more thorough examination the risks involved . '
It is instructive to note the way the press generally presented nuclear
power critics' early attempts to bring attention to the uncertainties about plant
safety. The day after the 1971 shareholders' meeting, a news article in the
Oregon Journal referred to Morgenstern's resolution as "an effort by
environmentalists to embarrass officers and directors of Portland General
Electric.,,11 Earlier, Oregonian coverage of the Governor's Task Force hearing
in St. Helens by reporter and editorial writer Wayne Thompson seemed to
ignore the testimonies of Bacon, Williams, and many others, suggesting that
"despite Gofman's vehement arguments," testimony "generally favored
construction of the plant, with 15 witnesses testifying in support and 12
offering no protest." Thompson reported that Gofman spent an hour
"explaining his extreme view that the risk of building nuclear reactors 'is too
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great and the consequences too severe.",12 The irony in the press's
characterization of Gofman as an extremist is that at the very same hearing he
had made clear his general support for nuclear power. "I think I'm one of the
few real friends of atomic energy, because I want to proceed safely," he
explained. 13 It was indeed this more limited view of the problem of nuclear
power held by many the early critics of Trojan that set them apart from those
who emerged later to demand no less than an end to commercial nuclear
energy.
The more limited goals of the Oregon Environmental Council (OEC)
and similar groups with respect to Trojan contributed to a greater willingness
to compromise with PGE, leading to another major defeat for activists wholly
opposed to the plant. In March 1971 OEC, Friends of the Earth, and two other
environmental and sport fishing organizations had spearheaded an appeal of
the Atomic Energy Commission's licensing of the plant on grounds that it
violated federal environmental guidelines, an appeal that later went to federal
court. According to Williams, the goal was not necessarily to defeat Trojan but
to make it as safe as possible. 14 Faced with new AEC hearings on the
environmental impact of the plant on May 1, 1972, PGE sat down with the
environmental groups to negotiate a compromise. The next day the
organizations announced the agreement later described as the "Trojan
Compromise." PGE agreed to prevent discharges of zinc, chromates, and
residual chlorine and phosphates; conduct further geophysical testing of the
i '
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plant site; and limit radioactive waste discharges to five millirems per year,
regardless of whether the AEC adopted this as its final standard . In turn , the
environmental organizations agreed to drop their suit and to refrain from taking
any further action that would challenge the licensing, construction, or operation
of the facility . The utility also agreed to pay the groups' legal fees up to
$15,000. 15 The compromise was celebrated as a win by OEC and the other
groups because it required PGE to pursue a few of the safeguards the groups
had been advocating.
However. because most of the risks and problems from the nuclear fuel
cycle and the operation of the plant that anti-nuclear activists had been
working to address were not, many viewed it as a large-scale sell-out. Bell
recalled asking an activist from Friends of the Earth why the group had
supported the compromise "and the explanation was something about 'It was
costing us a lot of money, ' or whatever." From her perspective and that of
CSP, "that anybody would compromise on an issue like nuclear power safety
in order to get their bills paid was just abhorrent. 16 With the signing of the
compromise, any hopes of challenging the licensing of the plant were lost, and
several of the key environmental groups that had so far challenged Trojan
were suddenly removed from the picture. It took several years for the
remaining opposition to regroup and find viable political arenas in which to
intervene.
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While the Trojan compromise was indeed a setback for the anti-
nuclear movement in Oregon, it also set the scene for the emergence of a
different type of activist than its predecessors, who had focused on safeguards
and had objected to the plant merely because of where it was sited. Anti-
nuclear activists such as Lloyd Marbet and Nina Bell were fundamentally
opposed to nuclear power. Marbet was born in 1947 in Columbus, Ohio. and
grew up in Binghamton, New York. His father -- who Lloyd described as a
dominant, authoritative person _. flew 852s in the Army Air Corps during World
War II and met Marbet's mother, a Red Cross nurse, in a wartime hospital. 17
In 1966, a year after finishing high school, Marbet remembered, "my father
decided that I should join the service so he took me down and joined me up in
the United States Navy.,,18
At the time Marbet was shipped out to Vietnam he had never
questioned the institutional knowledge he had learned. However, when he
observed that the people he was ostensibly there to protect were more afraid
of him than of their supposed enemy, he recalled, "I realized there was
something wrong; there was a disconnect.,,19 The experience led him to the
conclusion that "the whole philosophy of questioning authority was necessary
in order to survive."zo After refusing to serve, he was amazed to find out that
the Navy was giving him an honorable discharge. Upon returning to
Binghamton, he completed a year of college in the liberal arts program of a
local community college, but the disillusionment he had experienced in
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Vietnam War led him to devote himself to antiwar activities. Deciding in
1969 to broaden his horizons further, Marbet bought a Volkswagen Bus and
set out for the West Coast with his pregnant partner of two years. They
planned on settling in California, but were so taken with Oregon's natural
beauty that they decided to stay, and soon found a house in Portland. Marbet
continued his antiwar work and worked to produce art supplies used in
Portland public schools. However, it was a separate event that led Marbet into
anti-nuclear activism, not his work against the Vietnam War.21
In 1970, just as Trojan was gradually gaining public attention, Marbet
and his partner, Diane, read a book about the hazards of commercial nuclear
power entitled The Perils of the Peaceful Atom by Richard Curtis and
Elizabeth Hogan.22 The experience of reading it left an indelible impression on
Marbet, and it is a story he often tells.
I remember looking up from that book and saying, 'Diane, if they build
the Trojan plant, I think we ought to go to Canada.' I turned the
chapter, and the title of the seventh chapter was 'Don't Bother
Running.' It literally shocked me. And at that point for the first time in
my life, I just suddenly realized there was not going to be a way to get
away from the destruction on our environment, and I realized I was
going to have to do something about this.23
However, what he realized he must do at that moment was not to go out and
stop Trojan but verify what he had read. "Ever since I was born," Marbet told
an interviewer in 1980, "I was always running away from the harsh things that I
discovered .,,24 This time, he decided to determine the truth, face it, and act on
it. For approximately two years thereafter Marbet spent much of his time
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reading about nuclear power from all sides of the issue and attended
meetings and hearings, where he met Oregonians who could share their
knowledge about the subject. When he finally determined the accuracy of the
horrifying account of the atomic industry in The Perils of the Peaceful Atom
and decided that he needed to do something about it, he recalled, "I became
an activist."
Although Marbet later became Oregon's most visible opponent of
nuclear power, his beginnings were inauspicious, unassuming', and at times
hesitant. In 1973, after being on the periphery of efforts organized by early
anti-Trojan activists John Bartels and Beulah Hand, Marbet decided to
participate in a hearing on the construction of PGE's Pebble Springs nuclear
plants, which the utility originally sited next to an active military bombing range
near the town of Boardman in eastern Oregon. "I figured, I'll go, I'll testify
against this, they won't listen to me, I'll go home, end of story," he
remembered.25 The proceeding turned out to be a pre-hearing conference to
identify the parties for and against the licensing of the Pebble Springs plants.
When the judge asked who was there to intervene against the facilities,
Marbet looked around and, seeing no other volunteers, raised his hand.
Swarmed with lawyers wanting to know what he thought he was doing,
Marbet found out that he needed a written petition to intervene and wrote one
out on the spot in pencil. Still, he realized he was not prepared in the least for
what he had committed himself to do. When he spoke with lawyers who had
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done anti-nuclear work, he recalled, "they said to me, 'You don't have a
prayer in hell. We've already done this; look what happened with Trojan!"26
When Marbet approached Robert Cobb, a local entrepreneur who was loyal to
the anti-nuclear cause, Cobb offered his office for Marbet's activities. The time
came for the licensing hearing, and Marbet was so flustered that he
accidentally rode the bus up to Boardman a day early and had to sleep on the
bank of the Columbia River the night before the hearing . Gregory Kafoury, a
Portland lawyer and fellow anti-Trojan activist, recalled Marbet's attendance at
the hearing
in a room with a bunch of 'blue suits,' powerful, Important, serious
people, and they all knew the reality. We were going to have 20 nuclear
plants in Oregon. It was a done deal. And this hippie shows up with one
year of college and he said, 'It says here that citizens can intervene
and can ask questions and can be a party. I would like to be a part of
this process.' They thought he was a joke.27
As Marbet's self-confidence abandoned him, he raised his hand. '" was
so full of fear," Marbet remembered, "and I just said 'I can't do this, I can't do
this . I withdraw my petition to intervene.''' Nevertheless, the would-be activist
stayed to see what happened and soon recognized he had made a horrible
mistake. When the Siting Council began questioning PGE's plans to construct
nuclear plants adjacent to a bombing range, Marbet saw that all he had to do
was ask questions. When the council required the corporation to designate a
new site for the Pebble Springs plants the licensing process started over again
and Marbet realized he had another chance. His confidence restored, he
explained, "I came into my own at that point." Marbet now began to teach
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himself administrative law and to study the rules and regulations for legal
proceedings. ''That's how I became involved in this movement, because no
one else thought that it was possible," he recalled . "I didn't even think it was
possible, I just thought it was important to raise the concerns, because the
concerns didn't go away."
In 1973 Robert Cobb had enough faith in Marbet's abilities to form a
new organization under whose auspices the activist and a few allies worked to
confront nuclear power in the Northwest. In order to remain incorporated
under the name of FOB Clearinghouse, Cobb's freight auditing company, the
businessman came up with the name "Forelaws on Board," which reflected a
conviction that the laws of the earth come before human law. The "Four Laws
of Ecology," which appeared on Forelaws on Board's letterhead and were
taken from a book by Barry Commoner, consisted of the following:
1. Everything is connected to everything else.
2. Everything must go somewhere.
3. Nature knows best.
4. There is no such thing as a free lunch?8
Although Marbet has tended to carefully avoid espousing any particular
philosophy or social vision, to a great extent his work as an anti-nuclear
activist seems to have been guided by a reverence for these principles .29
Nina Bell, like Marbet, has spent most of her life working on various
environmental and political issues. However, her introduction to activism, her
specific activities, and her strategies were all quite different than Marbet's.
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Bell was born in 1957 and, after living in various parts of the United States
and Europe at a very young age, grew up in Seattle. Her parents were both
environmentalists and she remembered having many political discussions at
home. One of Bell's lessons in being an active citizen came in 1971 when the
federal government announced that nuclear weapons tests would be carried
out on Amchitka Island, one of the Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska.
Bell's parents helped her send a telegram to President Nixon to register her
protest of the tests. Following a trip to British Columbia to visit Greenpeace
organizers, Bell's father returned with buttons, bumper stickers and
information, which the family distributed at various places. Bell was inspired
by her father's environmental convictions but for a long time felt too shy to be
outspoken about her own ideas. She wore a Greenpeace button to junior high
school one day and other students, not knowing what it was, poked fun at her.
"So I was forced to respond," she said, "even though I didn't want to talk to
anybody.,,30
One anecdote about Bell's formative years shows both her continued
environmental commitment and individualist tendencies. Involved in a "save
the whales" group in high school that she found too "wishy-washy," Bell
proposed a direct strategy: a boycott of Japan. When the group found this too
confrontational, she remembered , "I painted myself a sign and took it down on
the bus and walked around Seattle's waterfront with my own sign saying
'Boycott Japan, save the whales!'" Part of her individualism may have come
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from her shyness. "I was sort of being provocative," she acknowledged,
"but I didn't necessarily want to have to talk to anybody about it."31
Bell came to Portland in the mid-1970s to attend Reed College, hoping
to study and engage in political activities, but found that the institution did not
live up to its reputation for activism and that most students were too busy
studying to organize politically outside the school. "They call it the 'ivory tower'
for a reason," she has observed.32 During a summer break in Washington
State in 1976, she got involved with a Christian organization that was working
to put nuclear safeguards issues on ballot in itiatives. She remembers the
group -- which included quite a few doctors, lawyers and other professionals --
as a very "upbeat" assortment that, unlike her, was not committed to the goal
of shutting down nuclear plants. Despite this fundamental difference, the
experience afforded Bell further initiation in working on nuclear concerns and
introduced her to the issue of Trojan.33
After another year Bell dropped out of Reed in the summer of 1977 and
became active full-time in CSP and the newly-formed Trojan Decommissioning
Alliance (TDA) . Nineteen years of age at the time, she liked many of the CSP
members because they stimulated her intellectually, challenged her politically,
and shared her commitment to the nuclear power issue. "I wasn't looking for
[just] any political experience; I was looking for this one," she recalled .34
Formed in June 1977 by CSP members, the TDA sought to engage in
collective action with a larger number of people from the general public to do
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public outreach, and to engage in direct action, including civil disobedience.
TDA was an unusual anti-nuclear group in that it drew connections between
the often-separate issues of nuclear power and nuclear weapons,
collaborating on rallies and other activities with groups such as American
Friends Service Committee and Fellowship of Reconciliation.35 The CSP,
which focused on licensing proceedings and litigation, remained distinct from
TDA but its members remained active in TDA. In effect, the groups worked in
tandem but spoke to different forums. For Bell, part of the experience of being
politically active was developing a broad array of skills and methods with
which to participate.36
The startup of the largest commercial reactor in the nation was certainly
a victory for proponents of nuclear power, but it was not as flawless and
distinguished as the utility might have hoped. Immediately after test runs
ended in May 1976, the plant was shut down until September for repairs and
modifications. Ironically, while PGE had pitched the plant years earlier as the
only answer to looming catastrophic energy shortfalls, nuclear energy was not
in demand during the mid-1970s because low-cost hydro-generated power
was available for purchase.37 In July 1976 the Oregon Department of Energy
(ODOE) released the first state-sponsored energy forecast. The OOOE
figures indicated that PGE and Pacific Power and Light had drastically
overestimated the amount of electricity Oregonians would need over the next
Il
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twenty years. For example, PGE and PP&L had asserted that in 1996
Oregon would use 106.5 million megawatt hours, while the ODOE forecast
called for just thirty-four million megawatt hours.38 In fact, Oregon
A '·' '\I~ . ; o,' U,J ., J, ' )
consumption of electricity during that period would range from 45.7 megawatt
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hours in 1995 to 47.1;fl1egawatt hours in 1997.39
This evidence supports Marbet's belief that one of the key
underpinnings of PGE's nuclear program was a projection of perpetually
increasing power consumption virtually unaffected by rate increases.4o PGE
had a vested interest in increasing consumption by convincing household
consumers in the post-World War II era to use electricity for every possible
purpose and by encouraging industries such as aluminum manufacturers. A
larger number of consumers of electricity meant that the costs of building
generating facilities would be defrayed and the unit cost of electricity would be
lower. Oregon industry thus had an interest in the success of PGE"s plans to
build a network of base-load generating nuclear facilities. Even moderate
safeguards initiatives posed a threat to this system.
Although the post-Trojan compromise nuclear safeguards movement
was in its death throes in 1976, increasing awareness among Oregonians of
safety issues made conditions ripe for a safeguards ballot initiative, Measure
9. 41 This proposal would have made PGE fully liable for damages resulting
from the operation of nuclear plants and would have required the utility to
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convince a two-thirds majority of the Oregon State Legislature of two things:
first that emergency systems in nuclear plants would perform successfully
under operating conditions, and second that nuclear wastes would be safely
managed with no reasonable chance of escape.
PGE and other opponents of the initiative deemed these tasks so
impossible, that they simply referred to Measure 9 as a "ban" on atomic
energy. Shortly before the election, an industry newsletter of regional
aluminum producers sounded the alarm about the proposition and other "anti-
nuclear measures." The article echoed the utility industry's predictions of
looming energy shortages severe enough to threaten the economy of the
Northwest and the way of life of its residents. The accompanying graph, which
contained neither sources nor actual figures, showed energy consumption
increasing consistently into the future.42 The Oregonian provided little news
coverage of the debate on Measure 9 but published a major editorial penned
by reporter and editorial writer Wayne Thompson that opposed the measure
as "potentially devastating to [the] energy supply.,,43 The defeat of Measure 9
in the November 1976 election delivered a final blow to the moribund
safeguards movement. Peter Bergel, an activist from Eugene, felt a great deal
of disappointment in voters after the election. "I thought, 'God, they were
bought off so easy,'" he remembered. Then Sam Lovejoy, a prominent
nuclear activist, told him, "You've got to believe in the people. If you don't
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believe in the people in this business, you might as well forget it." Shortly
thereafter, Bergel got involved with TDA.44
By the mid-1970s an important change in the national context of anti-
nuclear activities had begun to take place: the emergence of the nonviolent
direct action movement. This phenomenon fully emerged with the creation of
the Clamshell Alliance to oppose the construction of a nuclear plant in
Seabrook, New Hampshire. Many activists had returned to New England in
the early 1970s after organizing against the Vietnam War in various parts of
the country. After attempting unsuccessfully to use legal means to prevent the
plant's construction, activists formed the Clamshell Alliance and staged mass
civil disobedience actions on the Seabrook site. The occupations began in
August 1976 and culminated the following year with a sit-in that resulted in
1,401 arrests. Motivating the group's opposition to the Seabrook plant were a
belief in libertarian-anarchist principles, the philosophy of nonviolence,
consensus decision-making, advocacy of large-scale civil disobedience, and a
commitment to implement the ethics of egalitarianism and nonviolence in
social life as a whole. Nevertheless, conflicts over strategy and the principles
of nonviolence arose as the group readied itself for a second large-scale
occupation. Faced with the likelihood of locked gates, the group disagreed on
principled and pragmatic grounds over whether to cut through the fences and
how to face the police response. The organization found these disagreements
insurmountable through consensus. The informal leadership began to
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question the consensus process and to some degree circumvented it, which
led to the dissolution of the group. Over the long term, these opponents of
nuclear power were unable to maintain political efficacy and an
uncompromising devotion to their values and did not succeed in stopping the
construction of Seabrook.45
Despite such failures, the Clamshell Alliance paved the way for a mass
movement based on nonviolent direct action with a vision of radical change.46
Parallel to these developments and perhaps to some extent as a result, new
alliances sprang up around the country to consolidate disparate anti-nuclear
activities and explore new avenues of involvement. In the Pacific Northwest,
these included the Olympia-based Crabshell Alliance and the Trojan
Decommissioning Alliance in Portland, separate organizations that maintained
close ties to each other.47 Although Bell saw key differences between the
Clamshell Alliance and the TDA, she acknowledged that the Seabrook
occupations had been an impetus and that the Oregon group had used a film
about Seabrook organizers as an educational device at their own nonviolence
training workshops.48 Eugene Rosolie, who had long been an active member
of CSP, remembers the beginning of TOA in the context of Seabrook and
changes in the anti-Trojan movement after the failure of the Measure 9. The
Coalition had not supported Measure 9 or any ballot measures because of the
belief that PGE would always be able to use its vast influence and financial
resources to defeat such initiatives. Rosolie was aware that once Trojan had
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its operating permits and began operation there were fewer opportunities for
legal intervention.49 "I was about to drop out of the anti-nuclear movement,"
he remembered. "Basically, I felt like, I'm carrying this whole thing, besides
Lloyd." He decided that unless more people got involved, he was out.
Norman Solomon, another longtime anti-nuclear activist in Oregon, was
staying at Rosolie's house and shared his view that something had to change.
"Norman brought up the idea that what we should do is what they'd been
doing at Seabrook. We should do an occupation ."so
TDA activists now scheduled an occupation of the Trojan plant for the
1977 anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The number of
respondents to the idea overwhelmed Rosolie. "Meeting after meeting just
grew with people," he said. "The people said, 'We don't want to pass
initiatives. We want to go out and do something . We want to make a
statement. ,,,51
Marbet, Rosolie , and Bergel had discussed the possibility of organizing
an occupation as early as 1975, but it took time, and the Seabrook example,
for the idea to come to fruition. Marbet decided not to participate at all in the
occupations. According to a number of his contemporaries, his individualist
personality made him out-of-place in TDA, which was committed to collective
action, affinity groups, and mandatory civil disobedience training for anyone
participating in the actions.52 Although Marbet was greatly influenced by his
studies of Gandhi, he did not personally believe that anti-nuclear civil
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disobedience was justified at that time. "I didn't oppose the early
demonstrations at Trojan," he explained, "but I think if you're going to do civil
disobedience it's incumbent that you have to be able to demonstrate that you
tried all of the other available processes that allow you to raise your
concerns.,,53
In the time leading up to the first occupation, the TDA held training
sessions for those who wanted to participate, formed affinity groups, and
taught conflict resolution skills and knowledge about the relationship between
the theory and practice of nonviolence. Members also arranged meetings with
both the police and PGE so that there would be no surprises for anyone
involved.54 In July, activists sent a letter to President Frank Warren proposing
negotiations "aimed at the permanent shutdown of the Trojan nuclear power
plant" and advising that if this could not be accomplished the group planned to
occupy the site. "All of us have difficult forces to manage in our lives," the
letter stated, "but when solutions are mortally offensive to others they must be
changed. If you cannot initiate those changes then others must initiate them,
and this is where we find ourselves today.,,55 The group also issued a
"Declaration of Nuclear Resistance" that outlined the reasons for the
occupation, called for support and involvement, and enumerated a series of
demands. These included : an end to nuclear power and to the centralized
control of energy by private monopolies, the dedication of energy resources
toward the development of clean and renewable power, and the compensation
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of jobs lost in the nuclear energy field through the expansion of the field of
natural energy.56
Early in the morning on Saturday, August 6, protesters arrived at the
Trojan plant and positioned themselves at the main gate and each of the
access roads. Instead of dispersing the protesters immediately, State Police
officers decided to wait them out. As a result, activists remained all of that day
and all the next. The company responded by transporting small numbers of
Trojan workers on weekend shifts to the plant by tugboat from the Columbia
River. Early Monday morning PGE became anxious as it readied the plant
and Visitors' Center for the beginning of the work week. A large shift of 170
employees was due at 7 a.m. "We felt we could not tolerate this any longer,"
Trojan plant manager Bart Withers stated. "At 5 a.m. I requested them to
leave the premises and take all their gear with them." As State Police
converged, protestors locked arms and chanted and sang "We Shall Not Be
Moved." The police arrested eighty-two demonstrators.57
"I think virtually everybody [in TDA] considered the first occupation to be
a major success," Solomon remembered. It was shocking to people, he said,
that that many people would choose to be arrested over the issue of Trojan.58
The protest was the first occupation of an operating nuclear plant in the United
States. 59 TDA members scrambled to make the most of the media attention
they received and immediately looked ahead to another, larger action. TDA's
plans for ever-larger protests used a model of successive growth designed to
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counter PGE's plans for a succession of nuclear facilities to meet its
projections of continuously increasing consumption of power. By the fall of
1977 both sides moved toward their respective goals in full force with no clear
indication of the conflict's outcome.
Chapter 3
The Conflict Transformed
The first occupation at the Trojan Nuclear Plant was a historic occasion
not just for local activists but for the entire U.S. anti-nuclear movement. As of
1977 no group had ever staged an occupation at an'operating nuclear facility.
At the time, Nina Bell later recalled, the enterprise seemed "unbelievably
impossible to achieve.,,1 When the first occupation went approximately as
planned, the group considered it a major success. As Norman Solomon
explained, the demonstration showed "that nonviolent direct action, in tandem
with some clear media outreach and strategic public statements, could begin
to make a dent and raise key issues.,,2 The media coverage of the event
brought an unprecedented degree of exposure to the conflict over Trojan. As
the Trojan Decommissioning Alliance focused the attention on the dangers
associated with the plant, the group's ranks swelled and its ties with other
organizations became stronger.
Throughout the entire time of the TDA's development the activities of
the Coalition for Safe Power and Forelaws on Board continued unabated.
FOB succeeded in forestalling the Pebble Springs nuclear facilities when the
Oregon Supreme Court upheld the group's appeal of the Energy Facility Siting
Council's license for the plants, ruling that additional hearings were needed.
In addition to Portland General Electric's difficulties pursuing additional plants,
the utility's problems maintaining Trojan became increasingly severe in 1977
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and '78. Nuclear waste storage was one pressing issue. Trojan was
designed to hold waste for a maximum of four years but delays in licensing
spent fuel facilities meant that the plant would be required to store its waste for
up to ten years. Because the plant's spent fuel pool was engineered to set
dimensions that could not be enlarged, PGE filed an application with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on January 4, 1977, to store the used fuel
rods closer together? Trojan opponents charged that expanding the waste
storage capacity might mean lead to its acceptance as a permanent waste
storage facility , violating one of conditions under which the plant had been
licensed . The environmental effects of long-term waste disposal at the site
had never been researched, and CSP members decided to intervene to push
for a formal study. The intervenors also hoped that, because PGE was
applying for a modification of its operating license, Trojan would be held to the
seismic standards the agency had adopted after granting the facility its
Iicense.4
PGE had hoped for a prompt approval from the NRC so that the
alterations could be made in April 1978 when the plant would shut down for its
first refueling . However, the NRC was not prepared to handle the intervenors'
petitions and established an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to rule on
them. When the board declared that geological questions went beyond the
scope of hearings on the spent fuel pool, the intervenors voiced their concerns
to others in the NRC, to the EFSC, and to Governor Bob Straub. "We tried as
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hard as an underfunded, unpaid citizen group could possibly do,"
remembered Susan Garrett of CSP. "We just ran into blank wall after blank
wall because nobody wanted to look under the rug.,,5 In October 1977 PGE
began what it referred to as "preparatory work" to expand the pool's capacity
beyond that allowed by the plant's operating license. Susan Garrett of CSP
claimed that the company was beginning the work in order to present the NRC
with "a 'fait accompli' which the NRC will be reluctant to reverse.,,6 After
several lengthy recesses, the agency approved the new fuel racks in October
1978. The frustration that CSP activists experienced as they tried to raise
their concerns through established channels contributed to their decision to
develop the TOA to explore other avenues. "Back then one could make the
licensing process do some good," Bell observed, "but it was also true that it
was not going to do that much good.,,7 Paradoxically, at the same time CSP
members pursued engineering questions in a way that depended on their
having credibility, the activists also engaged in direct action under TOA
auspices, which to many undermined their credibility, Bell acknowledged.
"That seems like a very odd dichotomy," she explained, "but we wouldn't have
gotten that kind of attention to the safety issues if we hadn't been jumping over
fences. "B
In addition to increasing awareness of nuclear issues, the TOA's
demonstrations also focused greater attention on the anti-nuclear activists.
Insofar as pUblic opinion was a factor in determining the outcome of the
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conflict over nuclear power in the Northwest, anti-nuclear activists had to be
just as concerned with projecting a positive image as the utilities, although
they lacked the resources or influence to do so. PGE's advertisements were
effective in convincing Oregon residents that atomic energy was safe, Bell
remembered, but when the Union of Concerned Scientists tried to purchase a
full-page ad in The Oregonian discussing nuclear safety issues the newspaper
refused to run it.9 Marbet told of an incident from his early days as an anti-
nuclear activist when he asked someone to sign a petition to tighten limits on
radiation releases and the person spit in his face. Marbet believed that for
many people the government could do no wrong, that anyone who would
question its regulatory practices was simply unpatriotic.1o In order to
overcome these barriers to debate it was the job of activists to call attention to
concerns that had not been addressed to their satisfaction and to maintain
some credibility in the process.
Lloyd Marbet serves as a good example of how those in the anti-
nuclear movement were portrayed in the media and perceived by the nuclear
industry and by the general public. When Marbet first began to intervene,
many viewed him suspiciously because of his "hippie" appearance and lack of
experience and formal credentials. Even as he became savvier, the press
treated him as an anomaly. In September 1976, an Oregon Journal story
reported that "Marbet, a hefty 20-year-old [in fact he was 29 years of age] who
sports a beard and dresses in workman's denims" became "knowledgeable
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enough to ask probing, occasionally embarrassing questions about the
utilities' policies." PUC hearings officer Richard Sabin admitted that Marbet
had done at least as well as professionals at the hearings. 11 Gregory Kafoury
remembered that in the 1970s he was nicknamed "the prophet of doom"
because of his bearded face and dire warnings about the dangers of nuclear
power.12 As Marbet gradually developed a great deal of knowledge and
experience in administrative law during the Pebble Springs hearings, he
began to dress more conservatively and win the admiration of some
professionals who did not share his viewpoint.13 However, his decision to face
arrest when he believed his rights were being violated led many to assume
that his strategy was merely to obstruct hearings, an assessment Marbet
rejects. 14
Rooted as they were in the methodologies of Thoreau , Gandhi, and the
Civil Rights movement, TOA activities remained mysterious and suspicious to
many, including the Portland Police Bureau. Well into the 1980s, the bureau's
intelligence division conducted extensive surveillance operations on those
involved in innumerable social, political, or religious activities. These files
showed that, to Portland police, Marbet's pet dog, a medium-sized mutt, was a
potential attack animal and the fuel can and hose he kept in his truck were
"obviously components of fire bombs.,,15 Police agents had infiltrated many
anti-nuclear organizations, including the TOA, and frequently issued reports
with no supporting evidence about alleged "terrorist" and "extremist" elements
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within the groups. For example, a June 1978 intelligence report charged
that six years earlier Oregon peace activist Peter Bergel had masterminded a
plan to seize hostages and bomb the partially completed Trojan plant. 16 In
fact, Bergel was a lifelong advocate of nonviolence who had not become
interested in anti-nuclear issues until 1974.17 This practice was not unusual in
intelligence programs across the country. For instance a 1977 report from the
New Solidarity International Press Service, a wire service to which many
intelligence agencies and surveillance units subscribed, reported that
Washington's Crabshell Alliance j which consisted of conventional
environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, was actually a "terrorist
front group.,,18 The stereotypes of members of anti-nuclear organizations such
as the Trojan Decommissioning Alliance flew in the face of the broad coalitions
such groups represented , involving people from a wide array of backgrounds
such as middle-class professionals, students with experience in the anti-war
movement, and farmers and fishermen who mistrusted utility projects and their
environmental effects.
It is difficult to gauge to what extent these suspicions were shared by
the general populace. But in the view of many who had witnessed the
upheavals of the civil rights and anti-war movements without understanding
their causes and intricacies, protest movements were generally suspect and
there were no clear distinctions between demonstrations, riots, and sabotage.
For many, these attitudes were confirmed in October 1977 when a pipe bomb
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exploded in Trojan's Visitors Information Center, resulting in a mere $15,000
in damages and no personal injuries. A note was found claiming that the
bombing had allegedly been carried out by the "Environmental Assault Unit" of
an organization called the New World Liberation Front. Predictably, this type
of incident was a setback to anti-nuclear groups because "guilt by association"
in the minds of the public only threatened whatever credibility anti-nuclear
organizations had developed. The TOA stayed its course, condemning the
sabotage and "any threat to life, whether from bombs or nuclear radiation.,,19
Because the strategy of most in the nuclear industry was to simply
dismiss anti-nuclear activists and their concerns through public relations
pronouncements, it is also difficult to document executives' personal attitudes
toward the opposition. Many executives of energy firms, such as PGE
President William Lindblad, have revealed feelings that their industry and its
representatives were the targets of misjudgment and unfounded suspicion.
The same deep-seated feeling of being misunderstood may be the reason for
the industry's reticence about nuclear issues.2° The view that Lindblad
expressed in a rare 1981 interview was that leaders on a technological path to
the future understood nuclear power in a way that outsiders could not. Mere
citizen activists who criticized nuclear energy, in his view, had simply found
they could earn a good living by ignorantly grinding their axes on the issue and
playing to the prejudices of the public.
21
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Another candid glimpse into the industry's views of people who
actively opposed nuclear power surfaced when Mark Dowie, a writer for
Mother Jones magazine, surreptitiously attended a national conference for
nuclear executives on how to assuage and defeat their opponents.22 Dowie
reported that in lengthy discussions of how to define activists the two favorite
characterizations were "itinerant crazies" and "destroyers," whom the group
agreed were people who "really just want to destroy America and the system."
The public relations head of Pennsylvania Power and Light insisted that not
everyone in the antinuclear movement was crazy; some had just fallen under
the spell of leaders who were "marching to an ideological drum played in
Moscow, where most of their money comes from ." No one disagreed. The
group divided the opposition into three categories -- revolutionaries, misguided
reformers, and social outcasts -- defined by lifestyles, hair lengths, and
general attitudes toward mainstream society. The executives agreed with
conference leader Irving Goldaber that a divide-and-conquer strategy would
succeed if the largest category, the reformers, could be won over. "For the
loud and unruly the only solution is war," he continued, and the use of violence
"in this case is a legitimate solution, because society must survive." Dowie
observed that it was the public relations and community affairs personnel at
the conference who most readily accepted hard-line tactics whereas security
officers preferred a "kill them with kindness" strategy. The meeting showed
that many executives tended to have just as drastically Manichean a view of
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the nuclear conflict as did some activists. It also revealed that industry
executives had a clear sense that the strategies they had tried to use in the
conflict were failing.23
Immediately following the first occupation of Trojan, the TDA began to
organize training sessions and assemble affinity groups for a second action to
be held on November 25, 1977. The group put a great deal more planning
into the second occupation, developing intensive and ongoing interaction with
the media that continued at least two years beyond the date of the sit-in.24
The stated goal of the civil disobedience was to "block the gates until Trojan is
permanently shut down." Bell has acknowledged that few who participated
literally believed that a single sit-in would shut down the plant. "It really was
modeled much more on a longer-term belief that if over time enough citizens
got behind something, that things could change," she explained. Bell's belief
was that change was seldom predictable or instantaneous, but that "if people
put their bodies on the line," then "more people will be attracted to participate
and question their own beliefs about things.,,25 With 123 arrests, the second
occupation was considerably larger than the first, and many organizers viewed
it as a great success. However, the protest lasted less than three hours,
compared to the 38-hour first occupation, and seemed to some to be a rather
dull, routine affair. 26 A column by Richard Meeker in Willamette Week referred
to the protest as "one of those events that just plain failed." According to
Meeker the sit-in neither threatened the plant's operation nor generated,
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coverage in The Oregonian that detailed any of the issues that brought the
protestors to the gates.27 In response to the occupation PGE focused its
stream of advertisements and public relations statements explicitly on the topic
of the anti-Trojan protests. A half-page ad in The Oregonian and The Oregon
Journal advised readers that although "Trojan is a good, safe and necessary
power plant ... there are those who seek very high profile ways to express their
concern and create headlines.,,28
The TDA continued to stimulate news coverage of the Trojan debate
the following month when a Columbia County jury found ninety-six of its
members innocent of the trespassing charges they faced from the first two
occupations, much to the chagrin of PGE and local officials. State
Representative Dick Magruder went so far as to propose that trespassing at
Trojan be promoted to a felony offense.29 A Willamette Week editorial by
Russell Sadler made the argument that because Columbia County had been
eager for the sizable economic windfalls that Trojan brought they should be
willing to pay the costs that go with it, including a trial "that could charitably be
described as a staged media event."30 One of the key facts in dismissing the
trespassing charges was that some of the protestors had been arrested after
PGE ordered them off Burlington Northern Railroad property neighboring the
Trojan site. The jurors voted for acquittal because there was reasonable
doubt whether PGE stayed within its legal bounds and thus that all of the
arrests were lawful. The defendants had also presented a "choice-of-evils"
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defense, according to an Oregon statute which excuses some illegal acts if
they are carried out with the intention of preventing an imminent danger.31
Although Columbia County District Court Judge James Mason had
instructed the jury to disregard this defense, the TDA celebrated the verdict as
a sign of solidarity with their cause. It is indeed possible that jurors had been
swayed by the defense's experts such as nuclear physicist Ernest Sternglass
and cancer research specialist Rosalie Bertell who had been permitted to take
the witness stand as well as the testimonies of some of the defendants
themselves.32 Approximately three years after the trial Nina Bell told an
interviewer, "I've never had a more powerful experience in my life than when
some people I knew got up and explained with cracking voices and tears
running down their faces why they had decided to join the occupation.,,33
Furthermore, after the trial two of the jurors expressed disappointment that
they had not been permitted to consider the choice-of-evils defense. One juror
added that he would like to have heard the rebuttal witnesses who had been
on hand to testify that nuclear power was safe. 34
District Attorney Martin Sells was candid about his disapproval of the
acquittal of the first group. The results, he said, "could lead to a breakdown of
law and order if it's not rectified." Ed Jones, one of the defense attorneys in
the first trial said Sells' statements "clearly have prejudiced the right of the
remaining defendants to get a fair trial.,,35 Subsequent trials of additional
protestors were indeed less favorable for the defendants. In a non-jury
70
proceeding, JUdge Mason gave two of the demonstrators the maximum
penalty for second-degree criminal trespass -- a $250 fine, a thirty-day jail
sentence of which Judge Mason suspended twenty, and two years probation --
with the condition that neither could return to the Trojan site. When a TDA
attorney charged the judge with prejudice against the defendants, JUdge
Mason recused himself from any future cases involving Trojan opponents.36
Following these events in 1978, the TDA grew prodigiously in size and
prominence, continued to develop outreach skills, and opened new offices in
Eugene, Salem, and Corvallis. The group also refined and improved its affinity
group structure. These small groups with rotating memberships were formed
to aid the consensus decision-making process and to facilitate various tasks in
a decentralized fashion. The operation of these units had been severely
strained throughout the arrests and arraignments of second occupation when
law enforcement officials attempted to overcome group solidarity by
intimidating and dividing the arrestees. However, the group process had
prevailed and the TDA moved ahead with its campaign to publicize the risks of
nuclear power.
A perennial point of contention in the debate over Trojan was the ability
of the plant to withstand earthquakes. Responding to concerns about this
issue, Director of the Oregon Department of Energy Fred Miller requested
input from the state Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, which
reported that the plant site was geologically sound "based on presently
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available information." Trojan opponents took this as a rather backhanded
reassurance because the lack of mandatory seismological guidelines at the
time of the site selection hearings meant that little such information had been
required and reports of potential earthquake hazards had been buried from
within by the Department of Geology, Bechtel, and PGE. The fact that the
plant had not been properly engineered to withstand earthquakes surfaced
conclusively in March 1978. At the request of the NRC the company had been
drastically increasing security measures at Trojan, including large stockpiles of
firearms, and decided to add a security window to the plant's control building
while it was shut down for its first refueling. This building was a four-story
structure that housed the control room and vital plant equipment. An NRC
investigator referred to the building as the "sine qua non" of the safety systems
at Trojan.37 However, in the course of these modifications, Bechtel discovered
that the control building had not been properly engineered to withstand an
earthquake in accordance with NRC standards and consequently was in
violation of the plant's operating license.
When PGE asked the NRC for permission to continue operating the
plant while deciding how to strengthen the building, CSP and the Columbia
Environmental Council (CEC) intervened in the hearings before the NRC's
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. Gregory Kafoury, the attorney for the
CEC, was astonished by the documents presented in the proceedings. Steel
"rebar," reinforcing bars the size of telephone poles supposed to be imbedded
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in the walls, were simply missing or were discontinuous in places where
regulations required them to be continuous. The documents stated that the
building had "approximately one half' the earthquake resistance required by
the original design specifications.38 Nevertheless on December 22, 1978, the
NRC issued a license amendment allowing full power operation of the plant
during plant modification, which Bechtel estimated would cost $6.5 million and
take up to a year to complete. Additionally, during the hearings the plant had
remained off line for approximately nine months, requiring PGE to spend an
additional $26 million to purchase hydro-generated replacement power during
the worst drought in the history of the Pacific Northwest.39
Bechtel was not under obligation to pay for these expenses because,
as documents circulated in the hearings had revealed, the $460 million plant
Bechtel had built for PGE only came with a thirty-day parts-and-Iabor warranty.
PGE sued, and each side spent the next two years readying documents and
conducting depositions. Before the case went to trial, however, attorneys for
PGE and Bechtel went before a federal judge to propose a settlement with a
condition of secrecy. The judge agreed, ruling on March 18, 1981, that
anyone involved in the litigation who revealed the outcome of the settlement or
any of the evidence that had been submitted would face contempt.
As all this transpired, anti-nuclear activism continued. Lloyd Marbet
continued to intervene on behalf of FOB before the Energy Facility Siting
Council (EFSC) and the NRC in opposition to PGE's proposed Pebble Springs
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nuclear facilities, which were abandoned in 1982.40 Beginning in 1976,
Marbet also began representing FOB in NRC hearings on Puget Sound Power
and Light's application for the Skagit nuclear plants near Sedro Woolley,
Washington, which the company abandoned in 1983. In addition to Trojan,
these plants were to be the first of twenty in the region-planned by the Joint
Power Planning Council, a conglomerate led by the BPA and consisting of
public and private utilities. The persistent opposition mounted by FOB spelled
the end for the Pebble Springs and Skagit plants and the majority of the
facilities proposed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
later failed due largely to high inflation, interest rates, unemployment, and
construction costs. Two of these were in the advanced stages of construction,
and WPPSS defaulted on $2.25 billion in revenue bonds. These events
suggested that the entire regional nuclear program was doomed to
catastrophic failure, but PGE made it clear that it would go on operating
Trojan.41
The Coalition for Safe Power petitioned the EFSC in 1978 and '79 to
revoke Trojan's license on the basis of insufficient earthquake resistance
capacity and inadequate fire protection and safety equipment. By June 1979
when Robert Pollard testified before the EFSC, CSP had spent a year and a
half attempting to petition the NRC on the same grounds but had received no
satisfactory results. Pollard had become a nuclear safety engineer with the
Union of Concerned Scientists after he resigned from his job as a reactor
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engineer at the NRC -- where his duties had included reviewing the
application from Trojan's construction license -- because his experience had
convinced him that the commission was not concerned with nuclear safety.
Pollard urged the council to review the evidence of Trojan's shortcomings
contained in the petition and to stand on its own authority rather than deferring
to the NRC's decision.42 Nevertheless, the council asked no substantial
questions following this lengthy testimony and proceeded to deny the petition.
Nor was there any substantive press coverage of the hearing or questions
raised about Trojan.
Anticipating these continued difficulties in stimulating awareness and
action on the issues of Trojan's safety, activists carried out a third occupation
between August 6 and 9, 1978. In addition to being the longest and largest of
the TDA protests, as some participants remembered, it was in some respects
the most chaotic. Protestors had to face new fences, which the utility had
installed as part of the drastic increases in security measures undertaken
since the previous occupation making it difficult to get near the plant. Instead
of damaging the fences, Bell remembered, the group decided to construct
portable staircases just before the protest to enable members to get where
they wanted to be arrested.43 In past occupations, Bell said, "I had all the
reason in the world to jump over the fence at that time because I realized the
system doesn't work.,,44 Nevertheless, she had remained one of the activists
who stayed out of jail in order to do organizational work to facilitate the
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occupation, legal processing, and media relations. This time, the
occupation had been going on for nearly four days, jails were filling all over the
state, and Bell decided to join the occupiers being arrested. "It was really
crazy and there was no way you could unscramble it by then," Bell recalled.45
Participating in a demonstration of that size was intimidating despite the
group's preparations and the songs they sang to calmly affirm what they were
doing, she said. "But after all that, when I actually got over the fence, you
couldn't believe how good it felt, the sense of satisfaction. ,,46
While the TDA hailed the demonstration as a major success, PGE
attempted to diminish any public support for it by stating that it had only
succeeded in wasting tax dollars. The TDA countered that "the astronomic
rate increases we have seen since Trojan went on line dwarf the costs of
prosecuting trespassers."47 After the second occupation, many journalists
took to describing them as charades in which the participants on all sides
played routine parts.48 However, PGE clearly did not take a cavalier attitude
toward the protests and sought an injunction to prevent arrested activists from
returning. Circuit Judge Albert Musick stated that although he could not issue
a sweeping injunction he could order twenty-seven of the key prior arrestees
to refrain from future protests at the plant or face severe contempt of court
charges. "In my opinion the public is fed up with unlawful demonstrations,"
Musick said in his order. He condemned journalists who covered the protests
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for giving notoriety to civil disobedience demonstrations, stating that such
reports "belong on the obituary page.,,49
It was clear that the utility, ever sensitive of its image, was fearful of
negative attention. Anti-Trojan activists continued to scrutinize the plant and
helped bring several crucial facts to light about its operation. An April 5, 1978,
an accident at Trojan had exposed two workers to seventeen rems of
radiation. The federal limit for exposure was three rems in any three month
period and five rems per year. NRC spokesperson James Hanchett
concluded that it was the largest such exposure ever to occur in a commercial
nuclear plant.5o In addition to efforts by local activists to publicize this event,
anti-nuclear groups elsewhere in the nation petitioned the NRC to penalize
PGE and forbid the restarting of the plant. Representatives from Ralph
Nader's Health Research Group and Critical Mass Energy Projects noted that
the radiation exposure followed thirty other safety irregularities over the
previous year. Many instances of the plant's non-compliance with federal
safety requirements were a result of systematic procedural errors, many of
which were tied to the spent fuel system. Critics of nuclear power quoted Dr.
John Bailer editor of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, who cited,
radiation doses of fourteen to seventeen rems as a clear cause of cancer of
the breast, thyroid, and many other organs.51 According to the ODOE, during
the refueling there were leaks that persisted for several days until PGE finally
identified them.52 Instead of informing the Department of Energy of the
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accident immediately, however, PGE delayed reporting it for eighteen hours.
Furthermore, the utility failed to begin its own investigation of the incident and
waited for ODOE and NRC inquiries to establish the details of the accident.
On the basis of these facts, ODOE Director Fred Miller concluded that Trojan's
problems stemmed from problems in the utility's management.
Management problems may also have been at the root of ongoing
problems with the Trojan staff, which nuclear opponents also monitored in
building their case against the facility. In the interest of improving
management, PGE had developed a feedback program whereby employees
could write memos to company administrators under protection of anonymity.
On March 7, 1979, an operations staff member submitted feedback criticizing
the general lack of accountability in the control room. Only one out of the six
shift supervisors really did his job, the employee said, and the rest of the
operators were equally inattentive most of the time to the point of sleeping in
the shift supervisor's office.53 PGE hired a psychologist to do a thorough
study of the problem of boredom in the control room but ended up entirely
rejecting his major proposals.54
A separate issue emerged the same year when investigation of a
Columbia County drug ring led to the arrests of eleven security guards at
Trojan, who had been selling large amounts of cocaine, amphetamines, and
LSD at the plant.55 PGE public relations denied that there was a problem with
drug use at Trojan, but an investigative report by The Oregonian revealed use
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of nitrous oxide, LSD, and amphetamines -- the latter as a result of being
required to work long hours, guards said. The story also indicated low staff
morale and a general lack of physical fitness, which combined with the drug
problem could severely impair the guards' ability to respond in case of an
emergency.S6 None of these problems had been identified by the NRC, whose
routine inspections were always announced with ample'time for the Trojan
staff to prepare a good appearance. "We usually knew a week in advance
they would be coming and what they were coming for," one guard said, and "if
there was a problem that would put them in trouble with the NRC, PGE could
have it under control."S? Anti-Trojan activists seized upon these developments
as further evidence that the nuclear plant was a "disaster waiting to happen."sa
The most significant event during this period influencing discussions of
nuclear power in Oregon was the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear
generating station near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in March 1979. For many
people throughout the nation and around the world the accident -- a series of
malfunctions, mishaps, and misinterpretations that nearly led to a total
meltdown -- was a reminder that the debate over nuclear power had real Iife-
or-death consequences. In addition to the intense news coverage of Three
Mile Island (TMI), the effect was intensified by a Hollywood film titled The
China Syndrome that by coincidence opened less than two weeks before the
TMI accident. Such a film would have been unimaginable just a few years
prior, when the anti-nuclear movement had not yet captured national attention
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and primed the media to dramatize nuclear accidents. It was a disaster-
themed thriller about a fictional nuclear plant, which was based largely on
Trojan. PGE had allowed the producers to tour Trojan and take photographs
which served as the basis for the movie's set design. Many people at PGE
had hoped that the film would stimulate factual consideration of the benefits of
atomic energy and were dismayed when the film turned -out to be a portrayal of
irresponsibility and corruption in the nuclear industry and the NRC.59
The company's defensiveness about its nuclear division and its image
increased by drastic proportions in the aftermath of these developments. As
far as public opinion was concerned, the TMI disaster marked a turning point
in PGE's long campaign to win long-term acceptance for atomic energy in
Oregon. Even Bill Babcock, the utility's most prominent public relations
spokesperson at Trojan, resigned himself to the view that it was "impossible to
inform the public well about nuclear power" because it would have required a
level of education beyond that which the company's pUblic relations sector and
even the schools could accomplish.5o Donald Kielblock, manager of plant
services, told an interviewer in 1980 that Trojan operators felt like pariahs
even in the relatively favorable community of Columbia County. One operator
told of going grocery shopping and when the cashier asked how things were at
the nuclear plant, the person in line behind the Trojan employee called him a
mass killer.51 Babcock also described feeling great pressure from the media
following TM!. After an accident in April 1981, one shift supervisor told an
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interviewer that around fifteen minutes after the incident began the major
television networks began calling the control room to ask about the accident,
leading PGE to the conclusion that someone at Trojan was supplying the
media with immediate information.52
Anti-nuclear sentiment had caught up to PGE, but the company was by
no means willing to give up. In March 1980 the firm issued a sixteen-page
response to the Three Mile Island disaster. The report summarized several
studies on the root causes of the accident, which placed a great deal of the
blame at the feet of the NRC. PGE's document attempted to reassure the
reader that Trojan's safety equipment and emergency response procedures
had been augmented to make them even more effective. Major questions
about plant safety "have been answered in the year since the accident," the
statement read.53 What the vast majority of citizens did not realize, however,
was that there had already been another major accident in the United States
roughly four months after TM!. In July 1979 the erosion of a dam at the
Church Rock uranium mining operation in New Mexico allowed ninety-five
million gallons of radioactive water to spill out of holding tanks.54 This was the
worst nuclear accident in history, including TMI, but mainstream news outlets
deemed it unworthy of considerable press because it did not occur in a high-
population area. If it had received such coverage it is likely that it would have
focused even greater scrutiny on the nuclear industry.55
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In the fearful climate following TMI, it was the task of supporters of
nuclear power to call for cool heads and open minds. Innumerable editorials
and op-eds appeared throughout the state arguing in favor of Trojan, and PGE
distributed these to ratepayers as part of its public relations defensive.66
Governor Vic Atiyeh also attempted to assuage fears about the plant, stating
that one of the major problems at Three Mile Island had been public confusion.
He attested that if the accident had occurred at Trojan instead of TMI, "we
would have known about it within minutes and would have understood its
significance better." Gov. Atiyeh and Steve Loy of PGE public relations
argued that the governor should act as the "single voice" for disseminating
information during an emergency, a strategy that would prevent conflicting
information. Nevertheless, at least one reporter at the press conference
registered distrust of this idea on grounds that journalists would never stand
for such management of the news.67
The TMI accident added to the feeling of protracted upheaval created
by the third occupation and gave anti-Trojan activists an opportunity to
consolidate public doubts about nuclear power that the movement had
encouraged since its inception. Ironically, it was at this time that TDA began
to disintegrate. Members of the group began pursuing disparate strategies
and drifting into other political and environmental issues that took them away
from the narrow anti-Trojan effort on which the group was founded. For
example, Norman Solomon was drawn more directly to nuclear-weapons
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issues including scrutiny of Hanford Nuclear Reservation, which had been a
secondary concern of the TDA from the outset. 58 Other TDA members began
to work on issues such as uranium mining, people's utility districts, and utility
rate hearings. Solomon likened the TDA to a college, which gave large
numbers of people direct experience in organizing, media outreach, and many
other arenas of activism.59 Yet the organization seemed·to be plagued by a
large graduating class and too few teachers willing to remain indefinitely at the
same institution.
The largest cause for the TDA's disintegration was a schism over
whether to devote the group's efforts to legislative strategies. Bell
remembered that after the third occupation state legislators "were sitting up
and paying attention to the situation at Trojan." She remembers many TDA
members thinking that '''there must be something we could do that's different
We can't do the same thing year after year after year.',,70 Some activists south
of Portland began pursuing legislative tactics in Salem. Bell and several other
leading TDA members denounced this as antithetical to the group's
fundamental direct-action ethic. Because the Coalition for Safe Power worked
within the established channels of the regulatory system, it had always
remained separate from the TDA. The coalition continued to explore and
publicize problems with Trojan such as a crucial flaw in the emergency core
cooling system that had gone unnoticed for more than ten years.71 However,
the organization also branched out from and focused less and less on Trojan
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and other energy issues throughout the early 1980s, finally changing its
name to Northwest Environmental Advocates around 1987 to reflect this
evolution. These changes in the environmental movement of the Pacific
Northwest brought an end to the direct action phase of anti-nuclear activism in
the Trojan era. From 1973 on, Forelaws on Board had opposed numerous
atomic energy facilities that regional utilities eventually abandoned as well as
plans by Teledyne Wah Chang to dispose of radioactive waste in unlined
sludge ponds on the Willamette River flood plain. Much of FOB's anti-Trojan
work was centered on ballot measures -- a tactic that CSP had universally
opposed -- resulting in a November 1980 ballot measure by which Oregon
voters banned future nuclear plants in the absence of permanent waste
storage facilities. Eugene Rosolie later explained that he never believed a
ballot measure to close Trojan would pass and that even if it did PGE would
be able to challenge it in the courts.72
In 1986 FOB and the Don't Waste Oregon Committee, a membership
organization that worked in support of FOB efforts, sponsored Measure 14,
which would prohibit operation of nuclear facilities in the state until the federal
government opened a permanent radioactive storage facility. Modeling their
efforts directly on utility referenda that had succeeded elsewhere in the
country, including Oregon and California, FOB devised media strategies on
the basis of two arguments against Trojan: that energy surpluses which had
accumulated since the 1970s made the plant unnecessary, and that severe
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design flaws rendered it unsafe.73 The safety issue had been underscored
in many people's minds by the Chernobyl disaster that took place that year.
Yet the measure met a sound defeat when, in Marbet's view, PGE used its
immense resources to outspend grassroots opponents and manipulate the
electoral process with its preponderance of political influence?4 While FOB
and Don't Waste Oregon had only minimal funds at their disposal, PGE spent
$1.8 million to defeat the measure.75 Despite vigorous debate by activists and
utility representatives and detailed studies of shutdown costs, the public
remained largely confused about the initiative. A poll commissioned by The
Oregonian two months before the election showed that the public was largely
unaware that Measure 14 would entail closing Trojan; 62 percent supported
the measure (with 11 percent undecided), but 51 percent in response to
another poll question said they opposed closing Trojan (with 18 percent
undecided) .76
Following the Measure 14 effort, activists focused primarily on the
perennial issue of Trojan's general design flaws and specifically the possibility
of earthquakes. Two sources of information emerged that permitted them to
shed new light on these problems. The first was a three-inch stack of crucial
documents from the sealed PGE v. Bechtel case file, which someone had
serendipitously dropped off to Marbet in a paper bag on condition of
anonymity. To a great extent, Marbet, Kafoury, and other activists were
already familiar with the plant's design flaws but were astonished at much of
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what the smuggled documents revealed. For example, they disclosed that
at the time of Trojan's design Bechtel was building so many reactors that it
had no qualified engineers to do the job for PGE and had to turn to "job shops"
for personnel, which one Bechtel supervisor referred to as "the engineering
equivalent of a Kelly Girl.,,77 Initial designs for the control and turbine buildings
were done by someone named Muhammad Ali, who designed the shear walls
with a single layer of masonry blocks without making any calculations for
earthquake resistance. When Ali's incompetence became clear to Bechtel,
the firm brought in a replacement named James Edmunds to patch Ali's
design with added reinforcement. Edmunds' own testimony revealed that
before this assignment he had designed neither shear walls, nor earthquake
resistant structures, nor any complete structure, and indeed had never
designed any kind of wall prior to Trojan.7a Edmunds made numerous design
errors, but due to understaffing Bechtel did not check any of his calculations
until after the reactor was built.
PGE suspected the extent of the design deficiencies at least a year-
and-a-half prior to its mid-1978 report to the NRC. In fact, it had requested
seismic calculations at the end of 1976 following the discovery of the control
building flaws. 79 Bechtel replied that it would not be in their "mutual best
interest" to reveal the calculations because they "could easily mislead one to a
wrong conclusion."ao A confidential engineering study for PGE in January
1981 described an array of design errors in great detail and in the strongest
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possible terms. The report showed that Trojan's walls failed even to meet
the Uniform Building Code and concluded that the designers were "either
naively ignorant or intellectually dishonest.,,81 By then Bechtel had already
discovered the seriousness of the situation, and admitted that "this is the worst
mistake we have ever seen in a construction project of this size.,,82
The second piece of information about the earthquake issue was an
April 1987 article in Science by two geophysicists from the U.S. Geological
Survey that presented evidence of a vast "Cascadia Subduction Zone" in the
Pacific Northwest. Subduction earthquakes are severe quakes that occur due
to ruptures between oceanic and continental plates. This tectonic activity had
not been studied in the Northwest when Trojan was built, but this new study
compared the long fault off the coast of Washington and Oregon to similar
areas of southern Chile, southwestern Japan, and Columbia where
earthquakes ranging between 8 and 9.5 in magnitude had occurred. In 1700,
the most recent Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake sent a tsunami as far
as Japan.83 In May 1988 Richard L. Hill, editor of the Science section of The
Oregonian, wrote two pieces reporting not only that a major earthquake was
possible but that nobody in the region was prepared.84 Meanwhile, FOB
petitioned the EFSC for a "contested case" hearing to allow cross examination
on the potential impact of a subduction earthquake on Trojan. The EFSC
instead referred the issue to a subcommittee that held a single meeting. PGE
consultants, neither under oath nor subject to cross examination, stated that
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Trojan was built to withstand a subduction quake.8s FOB activists, on the
other hand, estimated from the available evidence that the force of such a
quake would be as much as one hundred times what the plant was designed
to withstand.86
In addition to this information, NRC reports revealed the discovery that
PGE had operated Trojan for fourteen years without a working emergency
core cooling system. Inspectors found that sump pumps needed to keep
water circulating to prevent exposure of the reactor core in the event of an
accident had been clogged with tools and other debris since the plant opened.
A PGE spokesperson admitted that this problem could have led to a
meltdown. These major operational errors had gone unnoticed because the
company not only failed to install integral parts of the system but also
neglected to conduct routine inspections. In response, the NRC issued PGE
its largest fine ever: $280,000.87 To put this figure in perspective, FOB pointed
out that in 1988 the company paid $90 million in dividends to stockholders. 88
FOB put these issues at the forefront of its 1990 campaign for Measure 4,
another ballot initiative to decommission the plant, which was rejected by 59
percent of Oregon voters.89
One factor in PGE's victory in 1990 was its denial of longstanding
charges that the steam generators that had been supplied by Westinghouse
were failing. Yet after the election the plant was shut down for approximately a
year for precisely that reason. PGE had to admit that a mysterious corrosion
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problem was causing wearing away of steam tubes, many of which had
cracks penetrating 90 percent of the original thickness.9o The escape of
steam from the generator could lead to loss of coolant sufficient to cause a
meltdown. No longer able to be patched, the plant needed new steam
generators that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. As technical
problems continued to plague Trojan, PGE consistently predicted dire costs
and energy shortfalls if the plant were shut down, and a solid majority of voters
continued to oppose ballot initiatives to do so. In 1992 DWO sponsored
Measure 5 to decommission the plant. Marilyn and Jerry Wilson, who as
proprietors of the local Soloflex company had become wealthy marketing
home fitness equipment and endeavored to devote some of their resources to
political goals they strongly supported, also petitioned for Measure 6, a ballot
proposal that would not only have shut down the plant but would have
additionally required PGE stockholders to pay decommissioning costS.91
In April 1992 PGE announced that after pursuing a lawsuit over the
faulty steam generators it had negotiated an agreement whereby
Westinghouse would replace the equipment at its own expense and take over
operation of the plant until 2011. The proposal was condemned almost
universally because Westinghouse had never run a nuclear facility and its
operation of Hanford had long garnered harsh criticism. PGE then announced
plans to run the plant with the deteriorating tubes in place until 1996, which
would buy the company time to develop generating capacity elsewhere.92
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Even as PGE searched desperately for an acceptable means to
close Trojan, most Oregon voters held to their belief that the plant should
remain open. Measures 5 and 6 faced resounding defeat, receiving 40 and 43
percent of the vote, respectively. Within a week of Election Day, defective
steam tubes at Trojan began to leak. The original estimate of one hundred to
two hundred gallons per day was upgraded to 7,200 within a few days. NRC
inspectors attributed the leak to worker error and gave permission for the plant
to reopen in ten days. Meanwhile, substantial disagreements over Trojan
were brewing within the NRC. While the NRC had prevented the controversy
from surfacing before the election, it was made public when dissenting
scientists approached Robert Pollard with their concerns. Pollard then
publicized NRC memos showing evidence that had produced widespread
opposition to restarting Trojan among the entire NRC Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Office and by Joseph Muscura, senior metallurgical engineer in
charge of the agency's Steam Tube Integrity Program.93
On December 1, 1992, NRC officials held a hearing at Trojan in order to
assuage concerns about steam tube damage and agency dissent. Yet
demands from Marbet and other activists to hear from dissenting scientists
were ignored by the NRC officials. Marbet then went to the governor, ODOE,
and the EFSC to urge an evidentiary hearing to determine the plant's safety.
Nevertheless, as he remembered, "every one of those agencies opposed me
and wouldn't do anything. That's what led me to the gates of Trojan." Marbet
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had never committed civil disobedience at the facility but by then, he said,
"I'd had enough. There was no other way to express the concerns that we
were having about this plant continuing to operate except to go to the gates of
the plant.,,94 Protesting the plant's reopening, Marbet and fellow activists were
arrested on December 1 and returned to the gates on December 4. Although
the company initially announced plans to restart the plant immediately, they
continued to postpone doing so.
On January 4, 1993, PGE announced that Trojan would never be
restarted. For Marbet, the decision showed that the firm was forced to admit
the nuclear option was wrong. "It's like the emperor has no clothes," he told
an interviewer. "They realize they're standing naked in front of the public right
now. There's no technology that's going to make this work." Ken Harrison,
the company's chief operating officer, disagreed. "We're not making a
statement about nuclear power," he stated. "I think somewhere down the road
nuclear could well playa part again.,,95 However, the failure of the nation's
largest commercial nuclear facility certainly was the era's death knell for
nuclear energy in the Pacific Northwest.
Conclusion
Portland General Electric's January 1993 announcement that the Trojan
Nuclear Plant would remain closed did not bring the controversy over the
facility to a neat conclusion, nor did it provide an opportunity for more thorough
investigations into the problems of design and operation. Amid conflict over
the disposition of the plant's decommissioned equipment and its 450 tons of
radioactive waste, PGE removed the steam generators in 1994 and the
reactor in 1999, transporting them 270 miles up the Columbia River to a burial
site at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation.1 This move was unorthodox from the
standpoint of Nuclear Regulatory Commission decommissioning protocol and
garnered criticism from members of Don't Waste Oregoll, who favored
mothballing the plant for fifty to one hundred years before dismantling the
reactor in order to allow time for high level radioactive decay.2 "Nuclear power
in Oregon is going out the same way it came in -- cutting costs and creating
unnecessary danger," asserted activist Gregory Kafoury.3
Oregonians continued to experience reminders of Trojan's legacy. The
spent fuel rods remained , awaiting the elusive national radioactive waste
repository, as did the cooling tower.4 Because Oregon voters had rejected
Measure 6 in the 1992 election, the $435 million cost to decommission the
plant fell to PGE ratepayers. The company also attempted to bill customers
$550 million for its investment and the profits it would have made had the plant
lasted until 2011 . When a court ruled the charges illegal, the utility pushed
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through a bill in the state legislature to override the ruling. Even after 88
percent of voters rejected the levy in a referendum in November 2000, PGE
sought a settlement for $300 million through the Public Utility Commission.s
This provided activists with solid evidence that the nuclear industry, like many
U.S. industries, depended on privatized profits while costs and risks were
socialized.
Because Trojan was in some respects unprecedented, PGE and the
Bonneville Power Administration had pursued plans for a series of large
nuclear facilities with little means to realistically forecast the costs and risks of
waste disposal, decommissioning, accidents, operations, and maintenance.
Trojan's severe economic impact was one of the most significant ways in
which the plant was a failure. However, PGE's unwillingness to cut its losses
resulted from much more than the facility's status as the largest private
investment in Oregon history. According to the view the firm had promulgated
for decades, Trojan 's apotheosis represented not just the company's future but
that of the whole society. The management believed it necessary to maintain
the position that nuclear power was safe and efficient in order to avoid a
catastrophic retreat into the Dark Ages.
In response, the anti-Trojan movement sought to bring about the end of
nuclear power in Oregon by challenging the credibility of the nuclear industry's
claims to safety and efficiency. It is ironic, however, as Lloyd Marbet has
speculated , that protesters ultimately played only an indirect role in the final
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outcome of Trojan's decommissioning drama. Two sets of circumstances
may account for this paradox. The first concerns the anti-Trojan movement
itself. First, activists had few funds relative to PGE's public relations
apparatus. Marbet has cited this as the chief reason for voter rejection of his
anti-Trojan ballot measures.6 Second, the anti-Trojan movement worked to
oppose an operating nuclear facility which had generated a great deal of
momentum. Many nuclear plants throughout the nation, inclUding PGE's,
navigated a relatively streamlined licensing process in the 1960s without
facing significant opposition because student activism, public interest groups,
and the modern environmental movement had not yet hit their stride. By the
time Trojan went on line, opponents of atomic energy in Oregon had learned
the importance of sustained action early in the licensing process to halt the
development of further nuclear plants.
Third, Oregon anti-nuclear activists were frequently divided into factions
by innumerable disagreements over means and ends. The large variety of
often incompatible philosophies and strategies afforded the anti-nuclear
movement a crucial measure of diversity but it also made it difficult to develop
a coherent praxis. Prior to the formation of the TDA, active opposition to
nuclear energy in Oregon was carried out by a sparse number of expert critics
and activists. The plurality of interests needed to mobilize an alliance to
decommission the plant could not remain focused on that specific issue long
enough to directly achieve the organization's ultimate goal.
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Fourth, opponents of nuclear power faced highly centralized control
in nuclear policy. This was diminished somewhat between 1974 and 1977,
when the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy were reconfigured into the NRC, the Energy Research and
Development Administration , and several Congressional committees.
However, the NRC's influence remained extremely far-reaching on both the
federal and state levels. Activist efforts to intervene in licensing processes
remained arduous but not without some victories, for example the eventual
defeat of the Pebble Springs nuclear plants.
Finally, unlike most environmental issues, the debate over nuclear
power (not including the early safeguards movement) was high-profile and
less "flexible" in allowing for a negotiated settlement to which both sides would
be amenable. Each side of the debate represented a core set of values
representing a conception of the social good irreconcilable to the other. The
society in which this specific conflict occurred was conflicted with respect to
these sets of values, partially incorporating into its worldview both ecological
values and a belief in a better society through technological control over
natural systems. These values were present in the Pacific Northwest in
especially stark contrast, where ecological values combined with a hopeful
view of technological progress as a cornucopia to be relied upon -- often
unquestioningly -- as a source of goods and resources.
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These circumstances made it difficult for a social movement to have
a decisive impact on Trojan's destiny. The second set of circumstances in the
Trojan narrative involves the internal contradictions experienced by PGE and
the plant's designers. As Lloyd Marbet has suggested, these parties may
have brought about Trojan's doom on their own. Indeed, each type of nuclear
plant design had its own Achilles' heel that grew worse with age.7 It was only
a matter of time before Trojan's weak spot, the steam generator, gave out,
although the plant had been plagued with design and operational problems
long before that occurred . Throughout the facility's life, PGE routinely shut the
plant down due to both the plentitude of inexpensive hydroelectric power and
innumerable problems and accidents. Because of a lack of standardization in
the nuclear industry, it was difficult for engineers to make repairs or replace
parts at Trojan.8 These flaws were common to nuclear plants across the
nation, such as the Millstone Nuclear Plant in Connecticut, where problems
with many components of emergency systems eluded inspectors for many
years.9 In this way, Trojan was symptomatic of severe problems in the entire
nuclear power industry. Operational difficulties at Trojan cropped up so
regularly that the plant produced at an average of only 50 percent of its
capacity, a figure that fell far short of the company's projections and translated
into higher electricity rates. Three years after Trojan's completion, rates had
already quadrupled. 10 Indeed, the inefficiency of nuclear power was so
persistently evident that by 1986 even some utilities purchasing power from
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Trojan began to endorse shutdown.11 Furthermore, when conservation
efforts brought regional power consumption far below the utilities' exaggerated
projections Trojan proved unnecessary as a base load energy producer.
By 1992, anti-Trojan sentiment had spread to numerous NRC
engineers. According to Eugene Rosolie, the leaked evidence of crumbling
NRC support for the plant was a major factor in the firm's sudden reversal of
its late 1992 decision to operate the plant until 1996.12 Rosolie has also
observed that as time went on and a significant number of the PGE executives
who had been directly involved in Trojan's development had left the company,
loyalties to Trojan within management became divided. Contention over the
plant's safety and economy combined with the culmination of its technical
problems to create a climate in which closing the plant was a far more viable
option than it had ever been before.
Because the plant was shut down by its faulty equipment rather than by
ballot, Marbet has suggested that the truths that emerged from the
decommissioning drama actually vindicated activists. Norman Solomon has
stated that nonviolent direct action and other opposition directly contributed to
the plant's closure by "chipping away at the ignorance and deceptions,"
creating scrutiny and debate. 13 The result was that the plant's public and
political standing was undermined, leading to a narrowing of options when the
failure of the steam generators forced PGE to reassess the plant's future.
Even though it proved too difficult for activists sway voters' faith in the plant
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even as more and more facts surfaced about its flaws. the campaigns
allowed activists to draw attention to Trojan's increasingly embarrassing
operational record and stimulate sustained public debate over its potential and
actual consequences. In the absence of such stiff political opposition, PGE
may have deemed a new steam generator for Trojan, or even a new atomic
facility, a worthy investment. The debate over nuclear energy also prompted
the company and Oregon residents to scrutinize alternatives to nuclear
energy. Although the company declared that the decision to close Trojan was
not a repudiation of nuclear power, it immediately announced that it would
invest substantially in windmills. 14
Anti-Trojan activism breached the separation between two closely
related factors in the fate of Trojan : the technical problems surrounding
nuclear power and the influence of public opinion on utilities and energy
issues. This gulf existed largely due to the quasi-monopoly on public
information enjoyed by the pro-nuclear side, especially before the Three Mile
Island accident, notably much of The Oregonian's editorial staff and PGE's
own Visitors Information Center. Additionally, the growing number of activists
opposing nuclear energy in Oregon and nationally in 1977 and '78 achieved a
public reaction sufficiently intense to contribute significantly to a de facto
moratorium in which no new commercial reactors were ordered after 1978.
The history of Trojan also underscored flaws inherent in the regulatory
process. The plant was operated by a company that was fully aware of critical
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problems with the plant's design and equipment and willfully ignorant of the
extent of those problems because it often failed to perform the routine
maintenance and inspections mandated by federal regulations. The NRC
routinely cited PGE for such violations but consistently failed to raise questions
about the problems underlying Trojan's design and operation. The agency too
often deferred to the company and the Bechtel engineers when it came to
investigation and correction of the basic causes of Trojan's problems. State
agencies, in turn , deferred to the NRC. For many Oregonians, it was far
easier to assume the plant was in good hands than to investigate complex
questions about the safety of atomic power and act on the basis of their
concerns. However, one can speculate that if it had been widely known that
by 1992 the NRC estimated the likelihood of meltdown at Trojan was three
hundred times the commission's own safety standards, large sectors of the
public might have demanded to know why the agency continued to allow the
plant to remain open .15 Many people who were concerned about nuclear
energy did not have the opportunity to take part in public protest or in utility
proceedings. These opportunities were diminished further by government
agency regulations that have tended to restrict meaningful public participation
in determining energy policy.
The result of this fundamental lack of accountability on the part of
regulatory agencies was that the watchdog tasks they were supposed to
perform often fell to critics of nuclear power such as members of the Coalition
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for Safe Power and Union of Concerned Scientists. Even the NRC itself
grudgingly acknowledged that the UCS had made a valuable contribution by
calling attention to technical matters the NRC had let fall through the cracks. 16
The systematic failure of utilities, contractors, regulatory agencies, and
government officials to adequately guard the public interest in the case of
Trojan is a salient example of the need for extensive and informed popular
involvement in decision making in all arenas and at all levels of politics and
society -- especially when the consequences involve the health, security, and
well-being of the people and the environment.
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